

Intrahousehold Consumption Allocation and Demand for Agency: A Triple Experimental Investigation

Appendix for Online Publication

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May 2021

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A Additional tables

A.1 Robustness checks

A.1.1 Controlling for intrahousehold cooperativeness, respondent agency and altruism

We re-run the main analysis controlling for various proxies of intrahousehold cooperativeness - partner (participant) age difference, count of decisions where the woman requires permission before making a decision, respondent age, whether the respondent feels the family member will respect their preferences if they are made aware of them and altruism towards partner as measured by the Dictator Task. Table A1 adds controls to the analysis for respect for partner's preferences. Tables A2 and A3 display results for ex-ante demand for agency in LAB1 and LAB2; and ex-post demand for agency in LAB2, respectively.

Table A1: Respect for partner's preferences

Dependent variable	Probability of choosing ...			
	...one's own guess of the partner's preferred option		...the partner's revealed preferred option	
Treatment sub-sample	No information		Information	
Experiment	LAB1	LAB2	LAB1	LAB2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.130 (0.108)	-0.024 (0.043)	-0.250** (0.108)	-0.102** (0.050)
Male - Stranger Same sex		-0.067 (0.048)		-0.050 (0.049)
Female - Family	-0.233** (0.104)	-0.128*** (0.033)	-0.038 (0.112)	-0.183*** (0.035)
Female - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.269* (0.138)	-0.095** (0.046)	-0.093 (0.142)	-0.124** (0.054)
Female - Stranger Same sex		-0.055 (0.049)		-0.135** (0.054)
Own altruism towards partner	0.039 (0.161)	-0.029 (0.048)	0.024 (0.168)	0.049 (0.053)
(Expected) partner's altruism towards self	-0.057 (0.153)	0.040 (0.048)	0.240 (0.158)	-0.129** (0.059)
Item is a drink		0.036 (0.022)		0.049* (0.026)
Respondent age	0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.002)
Partner age difference	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.011*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)
Needs permission for decisions	0.008 (0.015)	0.006 (0.004)	0.020 (0.017)	0.007 (0.005)
Partner knows preferred past time	0.021 (0.099)	0.139* (0.079)	0.294*** (0.094)	-0.071 (0.061)
Partner will select preferred past time	0.160 (0.105)	0.043* (0.025)	-0.287*** (0.101)	-0.002 (0.029)
Intercept (Male - Family)	0.740*** (0.252)	0.744*** (0.101)	0.131 (0.237)	1.095*** (0.096)
N. Observations	170	1216	166	1216

Note: Standard errors clustered at the pair level and in parentheses. Stars correspond to significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.

LAB2 observations include family matching observations plus stranger matching; subjects matched with a computer are not included since computers have no preferences. Furthermore, observations for food and drinks are combined. This means in LAB2 there are four observations per subject: food and drink for family matching; and food and drink for stranger matching – except for subjects matched with a computer, in which case there are two observations per subjects: food and drink for family matching. For uninformed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks their best guess of their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. For informed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks what they know to be their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. In LAB1, the number of informed and uninformed subjects differs slightly due to variation in the number of subject pairs across sessions.

Table A2: Testing demand for ex ante instrumental agency, controlling for intrahousehold cooperativeness, respondent agency and altruism

Dependent variable	Ex-ante agency: paying to get own pick before knowing partner's pick for self	
	LAB1 (1)	LAB2 (2)
Expected gain from choosing own pick: Drink	-0.062 (0.264)	-0.039 (0.048)
Expected gain from choosing own pick: Food		0.148** (0.061)
Cost of getting own pick		-0.001* (0.001)
Male - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.037 (0.067)	0.096** (0.046)
Male - Stranger Same sex		0.085** (0.043)
Male - Computer		0.031 (0.048)
Female - Family	-0.053 (0.076)	0.062* (0.032)
Female - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.123 (0.077)	0.281*** (0.053)
Female - Stranger Same sex		0.196*** (0.048)
Female - Computer		0.230*** (0.056)
Respondent age	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Partner age difference	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
Needs permission for decisions	-0.001 (0.008)	0.000 (0.004)
Partner knows preferred past time	-0.058 (0.060)	-0.063 (0.059)
Partner will select preferred past time	-0.047 (0.056)	-0.016 (0.023)
Own altruism towards partner	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Intercept (Male - Family)	0.117 (0.137)	0.298*** (0.081)
N. Observations	336	1432

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the pair level and in parentheses. Stars correspond to significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. In LAB1 willingness to pay for agency equals 1 if the subject prefers half a glass of their preferred to a coin toss. In LAB2 willingness to pay for agency equals 1 if the subject forfeits a fraction of their show-up fee to receive their top food and drink instead of receiving the food and drink selected by their partner. Instruments include a fully interacted set of dummies for gender, informed treatment, matching type, and own top rank. The cost of agency takes values 5, 20 and 50, equally randomized across subjects.

Table A3: Testing demand for ex post pure agency, controlling for intrahousehold cooperativeness, respondent agency and altruism

Dependent variable	Ex-post agency: paying to get own pick after knowing partner's pick for self
Experiment	LAB2 (1)
Actual gain from choosing own pick: Drink	-0.005 (0.021)
Actual gain from choosing own pick: Food	0.077*** (0.022)
Cost of getting own pick	-0.002*** (0.000)
Male - Stranger Opposite sex	0.137*** (0.044)
Male - Stranger Same sex	0.066* (0.037)
Male - Computer	0.027 (0.039)
Female - Family	-0.005 (0.025)
Female - Stranger Opposite sex	0.058 (0.040)
Female - Stranger Same sex	-0.002 (0.034)
Female - Computer	0.060 (0.043)
Respondent age	-0.000 (0.001)
Partner age difference	0.001 (0.002)
Needs permission for decisions	-0.005 (0.003)
Partner knows preferred past time	-0.104* (0.055)
Partner will select preferred past time	-0.040** (0.018)
Own altruism towards partner	0.000 (0.000)
Intercept (Male - Family)	0.315*** (0.070)
N. Observations	1432

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the pair level and in parentheses. Stars correspond to significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.

The Table reports OLS estimates of the effect of the actual gain from agency on willingness to pay for agency. The dependent variable equals 1 if the subject forfeits a fraction of the showup fee to receive their top ranked food and drink, and 0 otherwise. At the time of making the decision, subjects know what the partner has selected for them. The cost of agency takes values 5, 20 and 50, equally randomized across subjects.

A.1.2 Sub-sample analysis

We re-estimate regression for respect for partner's preferences for sub-samples of (i) respondents of above or median (and below) ages; (ii) couples with above or median (or below) age difference; (iii) females with low or median (or above) agency; and (iv) couples with and without same top ranked food and drink choices. Due to sample size considerations, we only do this for LAB2 respondents, where we have a total of 1216 observations across different matching treatments and consumption items (food and drink). Results are provided in Tables A4, A5, A6 and A7, respectively.

Table A4: Respect for partner's preferences: sub-sample analysis by participant age

Dependent variable	Probability of choosing...			
	...one's own guess of the partner's preferred option		...the partner's revealed preferred option	
Treatment sub-sample	No information		Information	
Respondent sub-sample:	Older (1)	Younger (2)	Older (3)	Younger (4)
Male - Stranger Opposite sex	0.007 (0.059)	-0.075 (0.064)	-0.147** (0.069)	-0.049 (0.070)
Male - Stranger Same sex	-0.064 (0.059)	-0.046 (0.062)	-0.024 (0.062)	-0.096 (0.077)
Female - Family	-0.118** (0.049)	-0.097** (0.040)	-0.194*** (0.054)	-0.122*** (0.045)
Female - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.121* (0.073)	-0.051 (0.055)	-0.074 (0.087)	-0.099 (0.061)
Female - Stranger Same sex	-0.085 (0.070)	-0.006 (0.054)	-0.153* (0.082)	-0.076 (0.060)
Own altruism towards partner	0.029 (0.069)	-0.055 (0.058)	0.157** (0.077)	-0.037 (0.067)
(Expected) partner's altruism towards self	0.080 (0.069)	0.000 (0.059)	-0.160** (0.075)	-0.095 (0.068)
Item is a drink	-0.015 (0.036)	0.078*** (0.030)	0.076* (0.040)	0.027 (0.034)
Intercept (Male - Family)	0.782*** (0.065)	0.854*** (0.054)	0.701*** (0.068)	0.864*** (0.059)
Parameter equality: Intercept (p-value)	0.396		0.076*	
Parameter equality: All other parameters (p-value)	0.293		0.494	
N. Observations	546	670	554	662

Note: Standard errors clustered at the pair level and in parentheses. Stars correspond to significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.

'Older' refers to respondents older than the median respondent age; 'younger' refers to respondents of median, or younger, age. LAB2 observations include family matching observations plus stranger matching; subjects matched with a computer are not included since computers have no preferences. Furthermore, observations for food and drinks are combined. This means in LAB2 there are four observations per subject: food and drink for family matching; and food and drink for stranger matching – except for subjects matched with a computer, in which case there are two observations per subjects: food and drink for family matching. For uninformed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks their best guess of their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. For informed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks what they know to be their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. In LAB1, the number of informed and uninformed subjects differs slightly due to variation in the number of subject pairs across sessions.

Table A5: Respect for partner's preferences: sub-sample analysis by partner age difference

Dependent variable	Probability of choosing...			
	...one's own guess of the partner's preferred option		...the partner's revealed preferred option	
Treatment sub-sample	No information		Information	
Respondent sub-sample:	Large age difference	Small age difference	Large age difference	Small age difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.035 (0.065)	-0.020 (0.058)	-0.184** (0.079)	-0.052 (0.062)
Male - Stranger Same sex	-0.044 (0.065)	-0.072 (0.056)	-0.053 (0.069)	-0.075 (0.066)
Female - Family	-0.074 (0.046)	-0.123*** (0.040)	-0.153*** (0.051)	-0.095** (0.046)
Female - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.035 (0.065)	-0.094 (0.059)	-0.214*** (0.079)	0.038 (0.063)
Female - Stranger Same sex	-0.045 (0.065)	-0.017 (0.056)	-0.055 (0.069)	-0.106 (0.066)
Own altruism towards partner	0.000 (0.065)	-0.044 (0.061)	0.022 (0.077)	0.077 (0.068)
(Expected) partner's altruism towards self	0.005 (0.065)	0.085 (0.061)	-0.127* (0.077)	-0.180*** (0.068)
Item is a drink	0.029 (0.035)	0.042 (0.030)	0.043 (0.039)	0.055 (0.035)
Intercept (Male - Family)	0.804*** (0.062)	0.826*** (0.056)	0.801*** (0.068)	0.788*** (0.059)
Parameter equality: Intercept (p-value)	0.803		0.892	
Parameter equality: All other parameters (p-value)	0.942		0.375	
N. Observations	552	664	560	656

Note: Standard errors clustered at the pair level and in parentheses. Stars correspond to significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.

'Large age difference' is the sub-sample of pairs where the age difference among partners is greater than sample median; 'Small age difference' is when the age difference among partners is equal or less than median. LAB2 observations include family matching observations plus stranger matching; subjects matched with a computer are not included since computers have no preferences. Furthermore, observations for food and drinks are combined. This means in LAB2 there are four observations per subject: food and drink for family matching; and food and drink for stranger matching – except for subjects matched with a computer, in which case there are two observations per subjects: food and drink for family matching. For uninformed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks their best guess of their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. For informed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks what they know to be their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. In LAB1, the number of informed and uninformed subjects differs slightly due to variation in the number of subject pairs across sessions.

Table A6: Respect for partner's preferences: sub-sample analysis by female respondent agency

Dependent variable	Probability of choosing...			
	...one's own guess of the partner's preferred option		...the partner's revealed preferred option	
Treatment sub-sample	No information		Information	
Respondent sub-sample:	Low executive agency	High executive agency	Low executive agency	High executive agency
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.186** (0.091)	0.014 (0.050)	-0.118 (0.093)	-0.109* (0.058)
Male - Stranger Same sex	-0.080 (0.072)	-0.060 (0.053)	0.000 (0.084)	-0.117** (0.059)
Female - Family	-0.121** (0.049)	-0.118*** (0.043)	-0.184*** (0.055)	-0.114** (0.049)
Female - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.090 (0.064)	-0.073 (0.065)	-0.086 (0.069)	-0.088 (0.079)
Female - Stranger Same sex	-0.059 (0.063)	-0.030 (0.065)	-0.175** (0.069)	0.011 (0.074)
Own altruism towards partner	0.002 (0.067)	-0.041 (0.059)	0.140* (0.074)	-0.015 (0.070)
(Expected) partner's altruism towards self	0.028 (0.067)	0.040 (0.060)	-0.101 (0.072)	-0.193*** (0.072)
Item is a drink	0.029 (0.034)	0.042 (0.031)	0.029 (0.038)	0.067* (0.035)
Intercept (Male - Family)	0.854*** (0.067)	0.813*** (0.054)	0.795*** (0.070)	0.818*** (0.059)
Parameter equality: Intercept (p-value)		0.598		0.792
Parameter equality: All other parameters (p-value)		0.820		0.185
N. Observations	554	662	562	654

Note: Standard errors clustered at the pair level and in parentheses. Stars correspond to significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 'Low executive agency' refers to the sub-sample of pairs where the decisions where the female respondent requires permission is greater than the sample median; 'High executive agency' is the sub-sample where the number of decisions the female respondent requires permission for making is less than or equal to the sample median. LAB2 observations include family matching observations plus stranger matching; subjects matched with a computer are not included since computers have no preferences. Furthermore, observations for food and drinks are combined. This means in LAB2 there are four observations per subject: food and drink for family matching; and food and drink for stranger matching – except for subjects matched with a computer, in which case there are two observations per subjects: food and drink for family matching. For uninformed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks their best guess of their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. For informed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks what they know to be their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. In LAB1, the number of informed and uninformed subjects differs slightly due to variation in the number of subject pairs across sessions.

Table A7: Respect for partner's preferences: sub-sample analysis by similarity in partner tastes

Dependent variable	Probability of choosing...			
	...one's own guess of the partner's preferred option		...the partner's revealed preferred option	
Treatment sub-sample	No information		Information	
Respondent sub-sample:	Similar preferences	Dissimilar preferences	Similar preferences	Dissimilar preferences
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.075 (0.057)	0.010 (0.063)	-0.155*** (0.053)	-0.068 (0.075)
Male - Stranger Same sex	-0.174*** (0.055)	0.022 (0.062)	-0.087* (0.050)	-0.090 (0.077)
Female - Family	-0.121*** (0.041)	-0.077* (0.042)	-0.129*** (0.037)	-0.118** (0.051)
Female - Stranger Opposite sex	-0.152*** (0.057)	-0.001 (0.063)	-0.096* (0.053)	-0.051 (0.075)
Female - Stranger Same sex	-0.016 (0.056)	-0.045 (0.062)	-0.060 (0.050)	-0.163** (0.077)
Own altruism towards partner	0.038 (0.063)	-0.044 (0.062)	0.088 (0.055)	-0.012 (0.078)
(Expected) partner's altruism towards self	-0.070 (0.063)	0.101 (0.062)	-0.067 (0.055)	-0.240*** (0.078)
Item is a drink	0.026 (0.031)	0.045 (0.033)	0.090*** (0.028)	0.010 (0.040)
Intercept (Male - Family)	0.930*** (0.055)	0.732*** (0.059)	0.882*** (0.046)	0.735*** (0.070)
Parameter equality: Intercept (p-value)		0.015		0.082
Parameter equality: All other parameters (p-value)		0.152		0.267
N. Observations	544	672	600	616

Note: Standard errors clustered at the pair level and in parentheses. Stars correspond to significance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.

'Similar preferences' refers to pair of respondents with the same top ranked food and drink; 'Dissimilar' refers to pair of respondents whose top ranked food and drink choices are not the same. LAB2 observations include family matching observations plus stranger matching; subjects matched with a computer are not included since computers have no preferences. Furthermore, observations for food and drinks are combined. This means in LAB2 there are four observations per subject: food and drink for family matching; and food and drink for stranger matching – except for subjects matched with a computer, in which case there are two observations per subjects: food and drink for family matching. For uninformed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks their best guess of their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. For informed subjects, the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject picks what they know to be their partner's top ranked item, and 0 otherwise. In LAB1, the number of informed and uninformed subjects differs slightly due to variation in the number of subject pairs across sessions.

A.2 Ultimatum game decisions

Table A8: Rejection in ultimatum game by gender and match type

	matching type		t-stat. vs
	family	stranger	family
Panel A. Any rejection			
Male subject	36.4%	28.6%	-1.03
Female subject	85.5%	77.8%	-1.28
t-stat. female/male	6.83 ***	7.54 ***	
	matching type		t-stat. vs
	family	stranger	family
Panel B. Rejecting offers below 600			
Male subject	33.8%	26.0%	-1.05
Female subject	84.3%	75.3%	-1.44
t-stat. female/male	6.83 ***	7.56 ***	
Number of observations	318		

This Table only uses LAB1 subjects who show sufficient understanding of the ultimatum game. That is, if they can answer three test questions on Player 1 and Player 2 earnings correctly. Similar results are obtained using all subjects. In the top panel the dependent variable equals 1 if the subjects rejects any of the offers received in the ultimatum game, and 0 otherwise. In the bottom panel the dependent variable equals 1 if the subject rejects any offer below 600PKR in the ultimatum game, and 0 otherwise. The reported averages and t-statistics are based on a regression of the rejection dummy on a fully interacted of dummies for gender and matching type, with standard errors clustered at the level of subject pairs. t-statistics significant at the 10% level are shown in bold.


B Knowledge of other's preferences

In this appendix, we provide the distribution of guesses in LAB1 and LAB2. In Figure B.1, we plot respondents' preference of drink for self (in black), plotted against the partner's selection for the respondent (in green) in the panel on the left; and the respondents' preference preference for self (in black) against the partner's guess of respondents preference.

In Panel (a) of Figure B.2 we likewise plot the preferences of the respondent (black) and partner's selection for the respondent (green) choice for LAB2 for food (left) and drink (right). In Panel (b) of Figure B.2 we plot the preference of the respondent (black) and the partner's guess of respondent's preferred food (left) and drink (right).


For LAB2, we report if respondents follow their own preferences when guessing their family member's match type (Table B.1) and by nature of preference (Table B.2). In Table B.3 we report correlation in preferences between family members and strangers by match type in LAB2.

Figure B.1: Distribution of preferences across drink items - LAB1




Notes: Figure B.1 shows the distribution of respondents' top ranked drink item preferred for self (black) against the partner's selection for the respondent (in green and in the upper and lower graphs on the left; and against the partner's guess of respondents' top ranked drink item (in green and in the upper and lower graphs on the right).

Figure B.2: Distribution of preferences across drink items - LAB2



Panel (a)



Panel (b)

Notes: Figure B.2 shows the distribution of respondents' top ranked food (left) and drink (right) items preferred for self (black) against the partner's selection for the respondent (in green) in Panel (a); and against the partner's guess of respondents' top ranked drink item (in green) in Panel (b).

Table B.1: Do respondents follow their own preferences when guessing their partner's in LAB2?

My preference	My guess of my partner's preference			
1. Most preferred food				
a. When matched with a family member				
	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	422	48	61	531
Chicken tikka	36	38	13	87
Zarda	45	17	36	98
Total	503	103	110	716
b. When matched with a stranger				
	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	412	86	33	531
Tikka	49	31	7	87
Zarda	54	16	28	98
Total	515	133	68	716
2. Most preferred drink				
a. When matched with a family member				
	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	481	35	30	546
Rooh Afza	28	12	6	46
Water	58	13	53	124
Total	567	60	89	716
b. When matched with a stranger				
	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	464	32	50	546
Rooh Afza	33	10	3	46
Water	71	9	44	124
Total	568	51	97	716
A: Combined percentages if matched with family member				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	84%	8%	8%	1077
Choice 2	48%	38%	14%	133
Choice 3	46%	14%	40%	222
Total	75%	11%	14%	1432
B: Combined percentages if matched with a stranger				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	81%	11%	8%	1077
Choice 2	62%	31%	8%	133
Choice 3	56%	11%	32%	222
Total	76%	13%	12%	1432
C. Difference				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	
Choice 1	3%	-3%	1%	
Choice 2	-14%	7%	7%	
Choice 3	-10%	2%	8%	

Table B.1 – continued from previous page

3. Least preferred food

a. When matched with a family member

	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	28	32	23	83
Chicken tikka	43	179	75	297
Zarda	35	66	235	336
Total	106	277	333	716

b. When matched with a stranger

	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	24	34	25	83
Chicken tikka	36	182	79	297
Zarda	27	77	232	336
Total	87	293	336	716

4. Least preferred drink

a. When matched with a family member

	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	38	49	16	103
Rooh Afza	31	366	71	468
Water	17	45	83	145
Total	86	460	170	716

b. When matched with a stranger

	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	28	50	25	103
Rooh Afza	48	366	54	468
Water	12	56	77	145
Total	88	472	156	716

D. Combined percentages if matched with family member

	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	35%	44%	21%	186
Choice 2	10%	71%	19%	765
Choice 3	11%	23%	66%	481
Total	13%	51%	35%	1432

E. Combined percentages if matched with a stranger

	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	28%	45%	27%	186
Choice 2	11%	72%	17%	765
Choice 3	8%	28%	64%	481
Total	12%	53%	34%	1432

F. Difference

	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3
Choice 1	8%	-2%	-6%
Choice 2	-1%	0%	2%
Choice 3	3%	-5%	2%

Table B.1 – continued from previous page

5. Combined preferred – in row percentages				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	83%	9%	8%	2154
Choice 2	55%	34%	11%	266
Choice 3	51%	12%	36%	444
Total	75%	12%	13%	2864

6. Combined least preferred – in row percentages				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	32%	44%	24%	372
Choice 2	10%	71%	18%	1530
Choice 3	9%	25%	65%	962
Total	13%	52%	35%	2864

Table B.2: Do respondents follow their own preferences when guessing their family member's in LAB2?

My preference	My guess of my partner's preference			
1. Most preferred food				
a. When my preference is the same as my family member's preference				
	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	344	31	41	416
Chicken tikka	6	10	2	18
Zarda	6	3	15	24
Total	356	44	58	458
b. When my preference differs from my family member's preference				
	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	78	17	20	115
Chicken tikka	30	28	11	69
Zarda	39	14	21	74
Total	147	59	52	258
2. Most preferred drink				
a. When my preference is the same as my family member's preference				
	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	378	22	14	414
Rooh Afza	0	0	0	0
Water	9	2	13	24
Total	387	24	27	438
b. When my preference differs from my family member's preference				
	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	103	13	16	132
Rooh Afza	28	12	6	46
Water	49	11	40	100
Total	180	36	62	278
A. Combined percentages if same preferences				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	87%	6%	7%	830
Choice 2	33%	56%	11%	18
Choice 3	31%	10%	58%	48
Total	83%	8%	9%	896
B. Combined percentages if different preferences				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	73%	12%	15%	247
Choice 2	50%	35%	15%	115
Choice 3	51%	14%	35%	174
Total	61%	18%	21%	536
C. Difference = proportion of self-choices that are driven by correlation in preferences				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	
Choice 1	14%			
Choice 2		21%		
Choice 3			23%	
Total				

Table B.2 – continued from previous page

3. Least preferred food

a. When my preference is the same as my family member's preference

	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	1	7	2	10
Chicken tikka	19	70	29	118
Zarda	14	37	123	174
Total	34	114	154	302

b. When my preference differs from my family member's preference

	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	27	25	21	73
Chicken tikka	24	109	46	179
Zarda	21	29	112	162
Total	72	163	179	414

4. Least preferred drink

a. When my preference is the same as my family member's preference

	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	4	6	2	12
Rooh Afza	17	244	45	306
Water	0	9	17	26
Total	21	259	64	344

b. When my preference differs from my family member's preference

	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	34	43	14	91
Rooh Afza	14	122	26	162
Water	17	36	66	119
Total	65	201	106	372

D. Combined percentages if same preferences

	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	23%	59%	18%	22
Choice 2	8%	74%	17%	424
Choice 3	7%	23%	70%	200
Total	9%	58%	34%	646

E. Combined percentages if different preferences

	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	37%	41%	21%	164
Choice 2	11%	68%	21%	341
Choice 3	14%	23%	63%	281
Total	17%	46%	36%	786

F. Difference = proportion of self-choices that are driven by correlation in preferences

	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3
Choice 1	-14%		
Choice 2		6%	
Choice 3			7%

Table B.3: Correlation in preferences between family members and between strangers in LAB2

My preferences	My partner's actual preferences			
1. Most preferred food				
a. When matched with a family member				
	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	416	55	60	531
Chicken tikka	55	18	14	87
Zarda	60	14	24	98
Total	531	87	98	716
b. When matched with a stranger				
	Biryani	Chicken tikka	Zarda	Total
Biryani	378	78	75	531
Tikka	46	30	11	87
Zarda	51	16	31	98
Total	475	124	117	716
2. Most preferred drink				
a. When matched with a family member				
	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	414	39	93	546
Rooh Afza	39	0	7	46
Water	93	7	24	124
Total	546	46	124	716
b. When matched with a stranger				
	Soft drink	Rooh Afza	Water	Total
Soft drink	409	52	85	546
Rooh Afza	35	4	7	46
Water	67	26	31	124
Total	511	82	123	716
A. Combined percentages if matched with family member				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	77%	9%	14%	1077
Choice 2	71%	14%	16%	133
Choice 3	69%	9%	22%	222
Total	75%	9%	16%	1432
B. Combined percentages if matched with stranger				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	Total
Choice 1	73%	12%	15%	1077
Choice 2	61%	26%	14%	133
Choice 3	53%	19%	28%	222
Total	69%	14%	17%	1432
C. Difference = proportion of self-choices that are driven by correlation in preferences				
	Choice 1	Choice 2	Choice 3	
Choice 1	4%			
Choice 2		-12%		
Choice 3			-6%	

C Sample size and power calculations for lab and field experiments

In this appendix we report sample sizes in each treatment cell for the two lab experiments in Tables C.1 and C.2. Sample size is smaller in LAB1 than in LAB2, but the number of treatment cells is also smaller. We also present power calculations (Tables C.3 and C.4). These calculations all assume a dichotomous dependent variable since our variables of interest all have that form. Given the context, we expect gender differences to be large and treatment effects to be consequential. We see from the Tables that in the worst of cases, we still have enough power to detect a change of 26% percentage points.¹ In most cell-to-cell comparisons, however, power is much higher, with a minimum detectable effect size of 8 to 18 percentage points for two-way splits and 12 to 26 percentage points for three-way splits, depending on the split. Power is in general higher in LAB2 than LAB1, due to the larger sample size. For direct gender comparisons, we can detect differences of 12.5% in LAB1 and 6-9% in LAB2. We feel that these values are well within the range of meaningful magnitudes that the literature and policy interest lead us to expect.

We also report sample size and power calculations for the field experiment in Tables C.5 and C.6. Given the large sample size, we can detect fairly small effect sizes – of the order of 4 percentage points for the effect of the treatment on agency, 3.5 percentage points for the cost of agency on its own, and 5.8 percentage points for their combination. Regarding the husband’s willingness to defer to his wife, we can detect effects as small as 0.9 percentage points with 80% probability.

Table C.1: Number of observations by treatment cell in LAB1

Matched with	Uninformed			Informed			All
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Total
Family member(*)	43	43	86	41	41	82	168
Stranger of opposite sex	42	42	84	42	42	84	168
Total	85	85	170	83	83	166	336

Source: lab data. There is one observation per subject. The matched family member is the husband in 75% of subject pairs. Subject pairs are randomly assigned to an informed or uninformed treatment (see text for details).

Table C.2: Number of observations by treatment cell in LAB2

Matched with	Uninformed			Informed			All
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Total
Spouse	179	179	358	179	179	358	716
Stranger of opposite sex	59	59	118	59	59	118	236
Stranger of same sex	66	66	132	66	66	132	264
Computer	54	54	108	54	54	108	216
Total	358	358	716	358	358	716	1432

Source: lab data. There are two observations per subject, one matched with spouse, and one matched with one of three possible ‘strangers’: opposite sex, same sex, or computer. Subject pairs are randomly assigned to the informed or uninformed treatment (see text for details).

¹ Using a cutoff significance level of 10% and a probability of detection (i.e., power) of 80%.

Table C.3: Minimum detectable effect size in LAB1

Comparison:	Sample sizes:		Detectable effect size
	N1	N2	
One-way	168	168	12.5%
Two-way	84	84	18.1%
Three-way	42	42	26.0%

Assumptions: Dependent variable is dichotomous. Identifiable effect size reported for $\alpha < 0.1$, power=0.8, and proportion among controls= 0.25. Very slightly different values are obtained for different proportions among controls.

Table C.4: Minimum detectable effect size in LAB2

Comparison:	Sample sizes:		Detectable effect size
	N1	N2	
One-way	716	716	5.9%
One-way	716	236	8.4%
One-way	716	264	8.1%
One-way	716	216	8.7%
Two-way	358	358	8.4%
Two-way	358	118	12.1%
Two-way	358	132	11.6%
Two-way	358	108	12.5%
Two-way	118	118	15.1%
Two-way	132	132	14.2%
Two-way	108	108	15.8%
Three-way	179	179	12.1%
Three-way	179	59	17.3%
Three-way	179	66	16.6%
Three-way	179	54	17.9%
Three-way	59	59	21.8%
Three-way	66	66	20.5%
Three-way	54	54	22.8%

Assumptions: Dependent variable is dichotomous. Identifiable effect size reported for $\alpha < 0.1$, power=0.8, and proportion among controls= 0.25. Very slightly different values are obtained for different proportions among controls.

Table C.5: Number of observations by treatment cell in the field experiment

	Control	Treated	All
Delegation by husband	487	1441	1928
Cost of agency to wife:			
50	504	1487	1991
200	504	1487	1991
	1008	2974	3987

Source: survey data. There are two observations on demand for agency for each female respondents, one response per cost of agency.

Table C.6: Minimum detectable effect size in the field experiment

Comparison:	Sample sizes:		Detectable effect size
	N1	N2	
Delegation:	487	1441	0.9%
Agency: Treated-control	1008	2974	4.0%
Cost of agency	1991	1991	3.5%
Two-way	504	1487	5.8%

Assumptions: Dependent variable is dichotomous. Identifiable effect size reported for $\alpha < 0.1$, power=0.8, and proportion among controls= 0.25 – except for delegation, where the proportion among controls is set to 99% to match the actual data. Very slightly different values are obtained for different proportions among controls.

D Experimental protocols

D.1 First laboratory experiment

At the time of invitation, all couples were given basic information on the experiment and details on the time, date, and expected duration of the session (2-3 hours). Each experimental session was held in a central location, at less than 20 minutes drive via public transport from any of the sampled *muhallas*. To facilitate participation by employed subjects, in particular men, we held sessions over the weekend. Each couple was also informed of the compensation and expected earnings from participation: a participation fee of Rs. 1000 (\$10) (i.e., Rs. 2000 per couple), provided that they stayed for the entire duration of the session; and additional earnings of at most Rs. 1000 (\$10). Informed consent was collected from all participants before the start of each session, and payments were made individually and privately at the end. Male questionnaires were not administered at the time of the RCT survey, thus data on males was collected at the time of the experiment.

Recruitment

Half of the LAB1 female subjects (98) are drawn in 2015 from among clients of a microfinance organization (the National Rural Support Programme, henceforth NRSP) participating in a randomized controlled trial (RCT). NRSP offers microenterprise loan products in urban and peri-urban areas of Bhakkar and Chakwal in the Pakistan Punjab and targets its financial products towards middle-aged married couples. Our initial intent was to recruit all of the LAB1 sample from the RCT sample in the Chakwal district. This proved impossible, however, because many invited households declined to participate due to time constraints. To make up for the shortfall, the LAB1 sample include randomly selected couples from the same *muhallas* – or geographical clusters – where the RCT households reside. More precisely, we first randomly selected from the list of female RCT participants within each *muhalla* one subject to be invited to the experiment. *Muhallas* were used as sampling units to limit the flow of information between participants of different sessions. We then invited to the same session one couple from every 3rd household living on the same street as the RCT invitee. These two steps were repeated until we found enough couples to participate in the session. 58% of the LAB1 sample is from the original RCT sample, and the remaining 42% are randomly selected pairs from the same *muhallas*.

Women are invited to participate with their husband. In case the woman is unmarried or the husband is absent, the subject is invited to come accompanied by the adult male with the greatest power over household's finances.

Sequence of events during experiment sessions

1. Upon arrival, subject pairs are assigned to their respective gender-specific room. 74.4% of the participants came with their spouse; 14.88% with their son and 10.72% with male household members (for instance, brother, brother-in-law).

2. Each subject pair is randomly assigned to a matching treatment: either with spouse/household member they came with; or with stranger of opposite gender. 50.6% of the participants were paired with family member and 49.4% are paired with a stranger.
3. Each subject in the stranger matching treatment is assigned a partner; this is done without replacement, which means that all subjects in the stranger treatment have one partner and one partner only; by construction, the partner is not the household member they came with
4. Half of the subjects are randomly assigned to the information treatment. The randomization is done by pair ID codes assigned at the start of the treatment.
5. No contact is allowed between subjects of opposite genders during the entire experiment. Men and women are seated in separate rooms
6. Subjects of the same gender are seated in compartments separated by cardboard sheets. Contact between subjects in the same room is strongly discouraged but not impossible.
7. Preference game is always played first in each session.
 - Subjects taste small samples of the three juice flavors.
 - Subjects rank the three flavors by order of preference.
 - Subjects pick the flavor they want to receive a full glass of.
 - Subjects guess the preference ordering of their partner.
 - Subjects in the information treatment are informed of the preference order of their partner.
 - Subjects pick the flavor they want their partner to receive a full glass of.
 - Subjects choose whether to take half-a-glass of their selected flavor, or 50% chance of a full glass of their selected flavor and 50% chance of a full glass of the flavor selected for them by their partner.
 - A coin toss determines which flavor the subject receives.
 - Subjects consume the juice.
8. Subjects play the Dictator (D), Taking (T) and Ultimatum (U) activities. The order of play is randomized across sessions as follows:

Game Order	Session No.
D-T-U	7,11,15,
D-U-T	3,5,9
T-U-D	1
T-D-U	4
U-D-T	2,6,8
U-T-D	10,13

9. The last activity is played. This is always the norms elicitation activity. Subjects answer two incentivized questions about financial autonomy of women. The two questions are answered twice; once the answers are matched to the spouse and once the answers are matched to a random stranger sitting in the next room. Subjects receive a fixed payoff of Rs. 250 for every question matched to a person sitting in the next room. Question about an ordinary purchase (scarf) is always asked before the question on

investment decision. The order in the which answer is matched to either the household member or stranger is randomized. This order of matching is as follows:

Answers Matched to:	Session No.
Household member, Stranger	1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15
Stranger, Household member	2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14

10. Show-up fee + pay off from randomly selected activity (DG/TG/UG/norms) is paid to each participant in cash. The participants are provided this case in white envelopes and in privacy.

We reproduce below the full protocol used in the experiment. The text below was read in Urdu to all participating subjects during the experiment. Square brackets [] contain instructions for enumerators.

Introduction to the community

Thank you [Community Head name or NRSP representative?], for organizing this meeting and allowing us to be here.

Also, thank you all for taking the time to be here today. My name is [experimenter's name], and I will be facilitating this meeting. Helping me today, we also have here [introduce everyone]. Before we start, we would like to give you Rs ____ as a compensation for your time. These Rs ____ are not a part of the activity and are yours to keep.

Purpose: Today, we will conduct several activities in your community. The purpose of these activities is to better understand how people in this community make decisions. The results of the study may eventually be published in a scientific article or part of a book. It is not part of a development project of any sort. Your community and other communities around [Province name] were selected to participate from a large group of potential communities.

Activities

We will perform several tasks here today. At the end of all the tasks, we will draw a number from this hat [show numbers and hat]. Each number represents one of the tasks that you will have performed, number 1 for task 1, number 2 for task 2, and so on. The number that is drawn will determine which task is paid to you. This means that every task that you play today has the same chance of being paid to you. So you have to be careful to choose exactly what you want for each task, because that decision can be the one that determines your payment at the end. Is this clear to everyone? Do you have questions on this?

For our activities, we will select 24 participants. In a moment, I will explain how we select the participants. Before that, I want to make some general comments. Participants will be performing some tasks in exchange for real money that they will be able to take home. You should understand that this is not my money. It is money given to me by Oxford University, to use to conduct a research study.

- We only need 24 individuals to participate in these tasks. Thus, unfortunately, not all of you will be able to participate.
- We will have a lottery to determine who will participate.
- To complete the lottery, we will write down your name and the name of your spouse on a piece of paper and then, fold the paper in half.
- Next, you will place your folded piece of paper in a bag.
- This means that we need one piece of paper for each couple present here today.
- We will then ask one of you to draw 12 pieces of paper from the bag containing the names.
- Those whose names are drawn will stay here and participate in the tasks, while the others will go home.

Is this clear to everyone? Does anyone have any questions on how we will select the 20 participants?

Please note that the meeting may take 3-4 hours, so if you think you will not be able to stay that long please let us know now.

Consent

- Before we begin, I will explain the basic activities we will do together, and the rules that we will follow.
- [Read Consent Statement]

If you wish to participate, please say, “I do.” If you do not wish to participate, please advise us. You will be free to leave then. You will not be able to stay in the activity room(s) if you do not wish to participate.

[Random draw of names]

Those of you, whose names have not been called, can leave now. Thank you all for taking the time to come today.

[After people have left]

You will be matched with a partner for some of the tasks that you will perform today. Who your partner is depends on a random draw.

- We will now ask one member of each couple to draw a card from this bag [Hold bag up and show its content].
- The bag contains 5 yellow cards and 5 green cards.
- If you draw a yellow card, we will give you and your spouse a yellow name tag to wear. If you draw a green card, we will give you and your spouse a green name tag to wear.
- The color of the card you draw will determine who your partner is for some of the tasks today.

We will explain more about your partner later, but for now we will go around the room for the random draw and to distribute the name tags.

[After people have been assigned to the spouse or stranger matching]

We will now take all women to one room, and all men to another room. Please follow [Assistant’s name] if you are a woman, or [Assistant’s name] if you are a man.

[Take the selected participants into the rooms and have them sit.]

[To the participants]

Introduction to participants

Welcome, and thank you again.

- Before we proceed any further, let me stress something that is very important. Many of you were invited here without understanding very much about what we are planning to do today. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave at anytime. If you do choose to leave, you won't be able to come back into the activity room(s) until everyone is finished performing all the activities.
- Before we start, please make sure your mobile phones are switched off, to avoid interruptions during the meeting.
- If you have heard about activities that have been conducted here in the past you should try to forget everything that you have been told. These are completely different tasks.
- Please also be advised, there are no right or wrong choices, so you should choose whatever you think is best for yourself and not look at your neighbor's choices. It is important to remember that not everyone will win the same amount in the task. Everyone will still receive the ____ payment for participation, regardless of how much you win in the task
- We are about to begin. It is important that you listen as carefully as possible to the instructions, because only people who understand the tasks will actually be able to perform them. I will run through some examples to make sure you understand.
- You cannot ask questions out loud or talk about the tasks with anyone else while we are here together.
- If you have questions at any time during the meeting, please raise your hand and ask, and we will come to you and answer them in private.
- I will read through a script to explain all the activities that we will perform here today. As you may know, these activities are conducted in other localities beside this one, so it is very important that people in every locality receive exactly the same information, and this is the reason why I must read from this script.

NO TALKING

- I will now say something very important. You cannot ask questions out loud or talk about the tasks with anyone else while we are here together.
- If you need to ask a question at any time, please raise your hand and I will come to you so I can answer your question privately.
- I will explain the tasks, do demonstrations, and let you practice the tasks before we perform them for real. These demonstrations and practices are to help you understand the rules and clarify any questions.
- Please be sure that you obey these rules because it is possible for one person to spoil the tasks for everyone by talking in front of the group. If this happens, we will not be able to continue forward with the tasks today and you will not be paid for the tasks.
- Is this clear to everyone? Does anyone have any questions so far about what will go on today?

[If anyone asks a question out loud, explain again that all questions must be asked in private]

REAL PAYMENT

- In today's activities, you will have the opportunity to receive a cash payment. The amount that you will receive depends on your decisions and on the decisions of others. It also depends on what task is selected to be paid.
- Remember that at the end of all the activities, we will draw a number from a hat. That number will determine for which task you will be paid. This means that each task that you perform has the same chance of being selected to be paid.
- Remember also, that in addition to what you will earn from the activities, each of you will receive ____ for participating in today's meeting. This money is yours, regardless of what happens during the activities. It will be paid to you in cash together with your earnings from the activities.
- It is real money, which you will be allowed to keep for yourself or do what you wish. This money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the meeting.
- During the activities you will make your decisions using paper slips [show slips], each representing 100 Rs. These paper slips will be converted into cash when you get paid at the end of the meeting.

CONFIDENTIALITY

- Your decisions and your payment are private and confidential. Nobody, apart from a member of our team will know what you earned, and he/she will not tell anyone.
- You all have a dark bag. You will have to make your decisions inside the bags, so that nobody else can see what you decide.

Instructions for preferences game (Task 1)

We are now ready to begin a task. Let me remind you that you may not ask questions or talk while you are here in the group. If you have any questions, you may raise your hand and I (the enumerator) or my assistant(s) will come answer your question privately. This is NOT the same task that you just performed, so be sure to listen to the instructions carefully.

Who will be your partner in this task? You remember that earlier we asked you to draw a card. Half of you drew yellow cards, the other half drew green cards. Your partner for this task is determined by the color of the card you drew.

- Those of you who drew a green card will be paired with a stranger in the other room. None of you will know exactly with whom you are paired. Only [researcher's name] knows who is matched with whom, and she/he will never tell anyone. [If this is not the first task: Your partner in this task is the same as the one in the previous task.]
- Those of you who drew a yellow card will be paired with their spouse in the other room.

Do you have questions on who your partner will be in this task? If you have questions, please raise your hand and I will come to you to answer your question privately.

[If this is not the first task: Your partner for this task is the same as the one for the previous task(s). That is, for those of you who drew a green card, your partner will be the same stranger in the other room that was paired with you in the previous task(s), while for those of you who drew a yellow card, your partner will be your spouse in the other room.]

Part 1:

I have here three different flavors of juice – apple, pineapple and orange. Before we begin this task, I would like you to taste each of these flavors and rank them on the basis of how much you like them. You should rank your favored flavor as number 1, your second-favored flavor as number 2, and your least favored flavor as number 3. You cannot rank two flavors equally. My assistant(s) will offer you a sample of the three flavors of juice, and then you should write down your ranking on the sheet we will provide you. [Distribute a sheet with pictures of the 3 fruits, subjects should write a number next to each fruit representing the ranking.]

Does anyone have any questions? Please raise your hand and my assistant or I will come and address your query.

Part 2:

Your partner in the other room has also been asked to rank the three flavors of juice. We would like you to guess your partner's ranking. We will now distribute a sheet, where you can write your guess. We will give you Rs. ___ for guessing correctly! This money will be paid to you at the end of all activities, on top of your earnings from the task that is randomly selected to be paid.

Part 3:

Now, we will distribute to half of you a sheet, containing the ranking given by your partner. The others will not know how your partner ranked the juice flavors.

[The experimenter and assistants distribute to a randomly selected half of participants (half from each group) the partner's ranking sheet.]

Now I would like for you to make two decisions:

- Choose what flavor you would like to consume.
- Choose a flavor for your partner to consume. It does not have to be the same flavor that you choose for yourself, nor it must necessarily be your partner's preferred flavor, if you know it.
- In the other room, your partner is being asked to do the same.
- There is a fifty percent chance that you will be given the flavor that you chose for yourself, and a fifty percent chance that you will be given the flavor that your partner chose for you. Similarly, your partner has a fifty percent chance to be given the flavor that he or she chose for him or herself, and a fifty percent chance to be given the flavor that you chose for him or her.
- Neither you nor your partner will be able to exchange the juice you are given with anyone else.

Shall we begin? Does anyone have any questions? Please raise your hand and my assistant or I will come and address your query.

We will now distribute a decision sheet, where you can mark your choices [Distribute a decision sheet, with space to record one choice for the subject and one for the partner]

Please fill in your choice in the sheet of paper in front of you and fold it to let us know you are done. My assistants and I will come and collect your decision sheet.

Part 4:

We will now call you one by one to the back of the room and give you your juice. We will fill a large glass of juice for you [Show glass: the glass should be opaque, so that others cannot see how much juice is in it]. Remember, there is a fifty percent chance that you will get your favorite flavor, and a fifty percent chance that you will get the flavor that your partner picked for you. How will we decide if you'll get your favorite flavor or your partner's pick? We will toss a coin when we come to you. If the coin toss yields heads, then you will be given your favorite flavor; if tails, your partner's pick.

When we call you to give you your juice, before knowing whether you'll get your favorite flavor or your partner's pick for you (i.e. before tossing the coin), we will give you the opportunity to make sure you get your favorite flavor.

How? If you are willing to give up some of the juice, we will give you your favorite flavor of juice for sure. So, if you choose to have your favorite juice for sure, you will be given only half a glass of it. If instead you choose to have your favorite juice with a fifty percent chance, or your partner's pick with a fifty percent chance, then you'll be given a full glass of it.

We will now call you one by one.

[At individual meetings] Here I have the piece of paper with your ranking of the juice flavors, another piece of paper with your partner's pick for you, and a coin that I will toss to determine if you will get one full glass of your favorite flavor or of your partner's pick.

Would you like me to toss the coin and get a full glass of juice, or would you like to get your half a glass of your favorite flavor for sure? [record decision and implement it].

Instructions for dictator game (Task 2)

[Note: before each session, the order of tasks 2-4 is randomized]

We are now ready to begin another/the first task. Let me remind you that you may not ask questions or talk while you are here in the group. If you have any questions, you may raise your hand and I (the enumerator) or my assistant(s) will come answer your question privately. [If this is not the first task] This is NOT the same task that you just performed, so be sure to listen to the instructions carefully.

- This task is performed by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. We will play two rounds of this task.
- Each of you will perform this task with someone from the other room.
- Who your partner is depends on the color of the card you drew earlier, as I will explain to you shortly.
- [researcher's name] will provide \$10 to Player 1 in each pair of players..
- Player 1 must decide how to divide this money between himself or herself and Player 2. Player 1 may allocate between \$0 and \$10 to Player 2.
- Player 2 takes home whatever Player 1 allocates to them, and Player 1 takes home whatever he or she does not allocate to Player 2.

Who will be your partner in this task? You remember that earlier we asked you to draw a card. Half of you drew yellow cards, the other half drew green cards. Your partner for this task is determined by the color of the card you drew.

- Those of you who drew a green card are paired with a stranger in the other room. None of you will know exactly with whom you are paired. Only [researcher's name] knows who is matched with whom, and she/he will never tell anyone.
- Those of you who drew a yellow card are paired with your spouse in the other room.

Do you have questions on who your partner is for this task? If you have questions, please raise your hand and I will come to you to answer your question privately.

[If this is not the first task: Your partner for this task is the same as the one for the previous task(s). That is, for those of you who drew a green card, your partner is the same stranger in the other room that was paired with you in the previous task(s), while for those of you who drew a yellow card, your partner is your spouse in the other room.]

We now run through 5 examples to show how the task might be performed.

[Notes: the researchers and assistants work through the examples and test questions with paper slips, each representing a Rs 100 note, on a flat surface with a line drawn on it demarcating the areas assigned to Players 1 and 2. Each of the examples presented below is presented either as an example or used as a test question as required. If more test questions are needed the researcher or assistant begin again with the first example above. The script below is written assuming that 6 more examples were given, 3 presented as test scenarios/practice rounds, i.e., the subjects are asked questions about the amounts the subjects would take home. The 11 examples/tests – 5 above, 6 below – cover the full set of possible choices for Player 1.]

1. Here is the Rs 1000. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 900 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs 900 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 100 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 900 equals Rs 100).
2. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 200 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs 200 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 800 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 200 equals Rs 800).
3. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 500 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs 500 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 500 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 500 equals Rs 500).
4. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 700 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs 700 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 300 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 700 equals Rs 300).
5. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate zero to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with zero and Player 1 will go home with Rs 1000 (Rs 1000 minus zero equals Rs 1000).

[The experimenter and assistants hand out two envelopes for each subject. Each envelope features the subject's ID. The two envelopes are of different color. Moreover, Player 1's [2's] envelope has a 1 [2] written on it.]

We will now practice the task together. You will first practice the task as Player 1. You have been handed two envelopes. The yellow [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines Player

1's payment. The other envelope, the blue [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine the payment to Player 2. As we work through the following examples, please put the paper slips into the empty envelope as indicated by the examples. We will walk around the room to check if your allocation matches the one from the example. This is important, because it allows us to make sure that everyone understands the task and how to make the decision.

Here are some more examples [The experiment assistants go around the room to check that subjects correctly place the paper slips into the envelopes. The experimenter explains the task again if mistakes are discovered]:

1. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 1000 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs 1000 and Player 1 will go home with zero (Rs 1000 minus Rs 1000 equals zero).]
 2. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate \$4 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs 400 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 600 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 400 equals Rs 600).]
 3. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 600 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs 600 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 400 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 600 equals Rs 400).]
 4. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 100 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 900] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 100]
 5. Now try this one. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 800 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 200] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 800].
 6. Now try this one. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs 300 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 700]. And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 300].
- [Before each session, the order of rounds is randomly determined] You will all perform one round as player 1 and one round as player 2. You will first perform the task as Player 1 [or 2, depending on randomization], and then perform the task as Player 2 [or 1].
 - We don't know yet whether you will be paid for this task, nor whether you will be paid for your decisions as Player 1 or as Player 2. How will we choose whether to pay you for this task, and whether to pay you as Player 1 or Player 2? After we have finished performing all the tasks, we will first draw a number from the hat [show again numbers and hat] to determine which task will be paid. If we draw the number 1 from the hat, then it means that this task is the one selected to be paid. If so, we will toss a coin: if heads come up then you will be paid as Player 1; if tails come up, we will pay you as Player 2.

[For Player 1s] You will now perform the task as Player 1. You have been handed two envelopes. The yellow [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines your payment. The other envelope, the

blue [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine the payment to Player 2. Please put the paper slips you want to give to player to the empty envelope. Please make sure your choice is not observed by others in the room. You must now wait while the rest of the players, finish performing the task. [If Player 1 is selected to be the first role to be played] Then we will play the second round of this task, where you are Player 2.

[The experimenter and assistants collect the envelopes.]

[For Player 2s] You will now perform the task as Player 2. Player 1 in the other room who has been matched with you has allocated a sum of money to you. After we finish performing all the activities, if this task and the role of Player 2 is the one selected to be paid I will pay you what Player 1 has allocated to you.

We will now perform another task/We will now take a break. [Researcher's name] will pay you for this task [point to the pile of envelopes to demonstrate the amount] after we finish all the tasks, if this task is the one selected to be paid.

Instructions for taking game (Task 3)

We are now ready to begin another/the first task. Let me remind you that you may not ask questions or talk while you are here in the group. If you have any questions, you may raise your hand and I (the enumerator) or my assistant(s) will come answer your question privately. [If this is not the first task: This is NOT the same task that you just performed, so be sure to listen to the instructions carefully.]

- This task is performed by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. We will play two rounds of this task.
- Each of you will perform this task with someone from the other room.
- Who your partner will be depends on the color of the card you drew earlier, as I will explain to you shortly.
- [researcher's name] will provide \$10 to Player 2 in each pair of players..
- Player 1 (not Player 2) decides how to divide this money between himself or herself and Player 2. Player 1 must allocate between \$0 and \$10 to himself, leaving the rest for player 2.
- Player 2 takes home whatever Player 1 leaves them with, and Player 1 takes home whatever he or she does not leave to Player 2.

Who will be your partner in this task? You remember that earlier we asked you to draw a card. Half of you drew yellow cards, the other half drew green cards. Your partner for this task is determined by the color of the card you drew.

- Those of you who drew a green card will be paired with a stranger in the other room. None of you will know exactly with whom you are paired. Only [researcher's name] knows who is matched with whom, and she/he will never tell anyone. [If this is not the first task: Your partner in this task is the same as the one in the previous task.]
- Those of you who drew a yellow card will be paired with their spouse in the other room.

Do you have questions on who your partner will be in this task? If you have questions, please raise your hand and I will come to you to answer your question privately.

[If this is not the first task: Your partner for this task is the same as the one for the previous task(s). That is, for those of you who drew a green card, your partner will be the same stranger in the other room that was paired with you in the previous task(s), while for those of you who drew a yellow card, your partner will be your spouse in the other room.]

We will now run through 5 examples to show you how the task might be performed:

[Notes: the researchers and assistants work through the examples and test questions with paper slips, each representing a Rs 100 note, on a flat surface with a line drawn on it demarcating the areas assigned to Players 1 and 2. Each of the examples presented below is presented either as an example or used as a test question as required. If more test questions are needed the researcher or assistant begin again with the first example above. The script below is written assuming that 6 more examples were given, 3 presented as test scenarios/practice rounds, i.e., the subjects are asked questions about the amounts the subjects would take home. The 11 examples/tests – 5 above, 6 below – cover the full set of possible choices for Player 1.]

1. Here is the Rs 1000 given to Player 2. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 900 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs 900 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 100 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 900 equals Rs 100).
2. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 200 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs 200 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 800 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 200 equals Rs 800).
3. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 500 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs 500 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 500 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 500 equals Rs 500).
4. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 700 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs 700 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 300 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 700 equals Rs 300).
5. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to leave zero to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with zero and Player 1 will go home with Rs 1000 (Rs 1000 minus zero equals Rs 1000).

[The experimenter and assistants hand out two envelopes for each subject. Each envelope features the subject's ID. The two envelopes are of different color. Moreover, Player 1's [2's] envelope has a 1 [2] written on it.]

We will now practice the task together. You will first practice the task as Player 2. You have been handed two envelopes. The blue [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines Player 2's payment. The other envelope, the yellow [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine the payment to Player 1. As we work through the following examples, please put the paper slips into the empty envelope as indicated by the examples. We will walk around the room to check if your allocation matches the one from the example. This is important, because it allows us to make sure that everyone understands the task and how to make the decision.

Here are some more examples [The experiment assistants go around the room to check that subjects correctly place the paper slips into the envelopes. The experimenter explains the task again if mistakes are discovered]:

1. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 1000 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs 1000 and Player 1 will go home with zero (Rs 1000 minus Rs 1000 equals zero).]

2. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 400 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs 400 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 600 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 400 equals Rs 600).]
 3. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 600 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs 600 and Player 1 will go home with Rs 400 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 600 equals Rs 400).]
 4. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 1000 to Player 2. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 900] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 100]
 5. Now try this one. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 800 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 200] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 800].
 6. Now try this one. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to leave Rs 300 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 700]. And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 300].
- [Before each session, the order of rounds is randomly determined] You will all perform one round as Player 1 and one round as Player 2. You will first perform the task as Player 1 [or 2, depending on randomization], and then perform the task as Player 2 [or 1].
 - We don't know yet whether you will be paid for this task, nor whether you will be paid for your decisions as Player 1 or as Player 2. How will we choose whether to pay you for this task, and whether to pay you as Player 1 or Player 2? After we have finished performing all the tasks, we will first draw a number from the hat [show again numbers and hat] to determine which task will be paid. If we draw the number 1 from the hat, then it means that this task is the one selected to be paid. If so, we will toss a coin: if heads come up then you will be paid as Player 1; if tails come up, we will pay you as Player 2.

[For Player 1s] You will now perform the task as Player 1. You have been handed two envelopes. The blue [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines Player 2's payment. The other envelope, the yellow [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine your payment. Please put the paper slips you want to allocate to yourself in the empty envelope. Please make sure your choice is not observed by others in the room. You must now wait while the rest of the players, finish performing the task. [If Player 1 is selected to be the first role to be played] Then we will play the second round of this task, where you are Player 2.

[The experimenter and assistants collect the envelopes.]

[For Player 2s] You will now perform the task as Player 2. Player 1 in the other room who has been matched with you has left you with a sum of money. After we finish performing all the activities, if this task and the role of Player 2 is the one selected to be paid I will pay you what Player 1 has left you with.

We will now perform another task/We will now take a break. [Researcher's name] will pay you for this task [point to the pile of envelopes to demonstrate the amount] after we finish all the tasks, if this task is the one selected to be paid.

Instructions for ultimatum game (Task 4)

We are now ready to begin another/the first task. Let me remind you that you may not ask questions or talk while you are here in the group. If you have any questions, you may raise your hand and I (the enumerator) or my assistant(s) will come answer your question privately. [If this is not the first task: This is NOT the same task that you just played, so be sure to listen to the instructions carefully.]

- This task is performed by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. We will play two rounds of this task.
- Each of you will perform this task with someone from the other room.
- Who your partner will be depends on the color of the card you drew earlier, as I will explain to you shortly.
- [researcher's name] will provide Rs 1000 to Player 1 in each pair of players..
- Player 1 decides how to divide this money between him or herself and Player 2. Player 1 must allocate between Rs 0 and Rs 1000 to himself, leaving the rest for Player 2.
- Before hearing the offer made to them by Player 1, Player 2 has to state whether he or she would accept or reject each of the possible offers between Rs 0 and Rs 1000 that Player 1 could have made.
- If Player 2 has stated that he or she would accept Player 1's offer, then Player 2 gets the amount of the offer and Player 1 gets the remainder. If Player 2 has stated that he or she would reject Player 1's offer, then Player 1 and Player 2 receive no money for this task.

Who will be your partner in this task? You remember that earlier we asked you to draw a card. Half of you drew yellow cards, the other half drew green cards. Your partner for this task is determined by the color of the card you drew.

- Those of you who drew a green card will be paired with a stranger in the other room. None of you will know exactly with whom you are paired. Only [researcher's name] knows who is matched with whom, and she/he will never tell anyone. [If this is not the first task: Your partner in this task is the same as the one in the previous task.]
- Those of you who drew a yellow card will be paired with their spouse in the other room.

Do you have questions on who your partner will be in this task? If you have questions, please raise your hand and I will come to you to answer your question privately.

[If this is not the first task: Your partner for this task is the same as the one for the previous task(s). That is, for those of you who drew a green card, your partner will be the same stranger in the other room that was paired with you in the previous task(s), while for those of you who drew a yellow card, your partner will be your spouse in the other room.]

We will now run through 5 examples to show you how the task might be performed:

[Notes: the researchers and assistants work through the examples and test questions with paper slips, each representing a Rs 100 note, on a flat surface with a line drawn on it demarcating the areas assigned to Players 1 and 2. Each of the examples presented below is presented either as an example or used as a test question

as required. If more test questions are needed the researcher or assistant begin again with the first example above. The script below is written assuming that 6 more examples were given, 3 presented as test scenarios/practice rounds, i.e., the subjects are asked questions about the amounts the subjects would take home. The 11 examples/tests – 5 above, 6 below – cover the full set of possible choices for Player 1.]

1. Here is the first example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$9 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of \$9 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 might have made, but we will not worry about that now.) Because Player 2 said he would reject \$9, Player 1 goes home with nothing and Player 2 goes home with nothing.
2. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$9 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of \$9 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 might have made, but we will not worry about that now.) In this case, Player 1 goes home with \$1 (\$10 minus \$9 equals \$1) and Player 2 goes home \$9.
3. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$2 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of \$2 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 might have made, but we will not worry about that now.) Because Player 2 said he would accept this offer, Player 1 goes home with \$8 (\$10 minus \$2 equals \$8), and Player 2 goes home with \$2.
4. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$2 to Player 2. But now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of \$2 from Player 1. (Player 2 also stated whether he would accept or reject each of the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now.) In this case, Player 1 goes home with nothing, and Player 2 also goes home with nothing.
5. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$5 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of \$5 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now.) Because Player 2 said he would reject an offer of \$5 from Player, Player 1 goes home with nothing and Player 2 goes home with nothing.
6. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$5 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of \$5 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether they would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now.) In this case, Player 1 goes home with \$5 (\$10 minus \$5 is \$5) and Player 2 goes home with \$5.
7. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$7 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of \$7 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now.) Because Player 2 said he would accept an offer of \$7, Player 1 goes home with \$3 (\$10 minus \$7 equals \$3). And Player 2 goes home with \$7.
8. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$7 to Player 2. But now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of \$7 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 might have made, but we will not worry about that now.) In this case, Player 1 goes home with nothing, and Player 2 goes home with nothing.

9. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers \$0 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of \$0 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now.) Because Player 2 said he would accept \$0 from Player 1, Player 1 goes home with \$10 (\$10 minus zero is \$10) and Player 2 goes home with nothing.
10. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 offers Rs 0 to Player 2. But this time, before hearing about this offer, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of Rs 0 from Player 1. (Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now.) In this case, Player 1 goes home with nothing and Player 2 goes home with nothing.

[The experimenter and assistants hand out two envelopes for each subject. Each envelope features the subject's ID. The two envelopes are of different color. Moreover, Player 1's [2's] envelope has a 1 [2] written on it.]

We will now practice the task together.

To practice the round of the task in which you have the role of Player 1, you have been handed two envelopes. The yellow [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines what Player 1's proposes to keep for him or herself. The other envelope, the blue [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine the offer you make to Player 2. As we work through the following examples, please put the paper slips into the empty envelope as indicated by the examples. We will walk around the room to check if your allocation matches the one from the example. This is important, because it allows us to make sure that everyone understands the task and how to make the decision.

Here are some more examples [The experiment assistants go around the room to check that subjects correctly place the paper slips into the envelopes. The experimenter explains the task again if mistakes are discovered]:

1. Imagine that Player 1 offers Rs 1000 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of Rs 1000 from Player 1. Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now. Then Player 1 goes home with nothing and Player 2 goes home with nothing.
2. Imagine now that Player 1 offers Rs 1000 to Player 2. But this time, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of Rs 1000 from Player 1. Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now. Then Player 1 goes home with nothing (Rs 1000 minus Rs 1000 equals zero (nothing)) and Player 2 goes home with Rs 1000.
3. Imagine that Player 1 offers Rs 400 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of Rs 400 from Player 1. Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now. Then, Player 1 goes home with Rs 600 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 400 equals Rs 600). And Player 2 goes home with Rs 400.
4. Imagine again that Player 1 offers Rs 400 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of Rs 400 from Player 1. Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now. Then, Player 1 goes home with nothing. And, Player 2 goes home with nothing.

5. Imagine that Player 1 offers Rs 600 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of Rs 600 from Player 1. Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now. Then Player 1 goes home with nothing and Player 2 goes home with nothing.
6. Imagine that Player 1 offers Rs 600 to Player 2. Now, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of Rs 600 from Player 1. Player 2 has also stated whether he would accept or reject all the other possible offers that Player 1 could have made, but we will not worry about that now. Then Player 1 goes home with Rs 400 (Rs 1000 minus Rs 600 equals Rs 400). And Player 2 goes home with Rs 600.

Test question formats:

7. Suppose that Player 1 offers Rs 100 to Player 2 and that, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of Rs 100. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 900] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 100].
8. And what if, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of Rs 100. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [nothing] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [nothing]
9. Now try this one. Suppose that Player 1 offers Rs 800 to Player 2 and that, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of Rs 800. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 200] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 800].
10. And what if, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of Rs 800. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [nothing] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [nothing]
11. Now try this one. Suppose that Player 1 offers Rs 300 to Player 2 and that, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would reject an offer of Rs 300. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 0] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 0]
12. And what if, before hearing about this, Player 2 has stated that he would accept an offer of Rs 300. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs 700] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs 300]

To practice the round of the task in which you have the role of Player 2, you have been handed a decision sheet. The decision sheet shows you the 11 possible allocations that Player 1 can offer to Player 2. For each possible allocation, Player 2 has to decide whether he would accept that offer or not. If an offer is accepted, Player 1 and Player 2 are paid according to the corresponding allocation. If an offer is not accepted, then both players are paid 0 for this task. Player 2 decides whether to accept or reject an offer by ticking the yes or no box next to the offer.

Now please practice the round of the task in which you have the role of Player 2 by filling out the decision sheet, accepting or rejecting each possible offer made by Player 1. We will walk around the room to check if you have any problems filling out the decision sheet. This is important, because it allows us to make sure that everyone understands the task and how to make the decision.

- [Before each session, the order of rounds is randomly determined] You will all perform one round as player 1 and one round as player 2. You will first perform the task as Player 1 [or 2, depending on randomization], and then perform the task as Player 2 [or 1].

- We don't know yet whether you will be paid for this task, nor whether you will be paid for your decisions as Player 1 or as Player 2. How will we choose whether to pay you for this task, and whether to pay you as Player 1 or Player 2? After we have finished performing all the tasks, we will first draw a number from the hat [show again numbers and hat] to determine which task will be paid. If we draw the number 1 from the hat, then it means that this task is the one selected to be paid. If so, we will toss a coin: if heads come up then you will be paid as Player 1; if tails come up, we will pay you as Player 2.

[For Player 1s] You will now perform the task as Player 1. You have been handed two envelopes. The yellow [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines what you propose to keep for yourself. The other envelope, the blue [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine the offer you make to Player 2. Please put the paper slips you want to give to player to the empty envelope. Please make sure your choice is not observed by others in the room. You must now wait while the rest of the players finish performing the task. [If Player 1 is selected to be the first role to be played] Then we will play the second round of this task, where you are Player 2.

[The experimenter and assistants collect the envelopes.]

[For Player 2s] You are a Player 2. Player 1 has allocated a sum of money to you. This money is in an envelope filled by someone in the other room. Before you know Player 1's offer to you, tell me for each possible offer Player 1 could make whether you would accept or reject it [Hand subjects a sheet with different possible offer and have them select the ones they will accept and those they will reject. Each decision sheet is marked with the subject ID]. These decisions will determine what you actually receive once we see what Player 1 has offered you. Please note that you will not get a chance to change your mind after the envelope has been handed over. [Occasionally, when it seemed necessary, the players were given the following reminder. . .] Remember that Player 1's offer is already in an envelope. Nothing you decide now can change what is in it.

Now please make your decisions by filling out the decision sheet, accepting or rejecting each possible offer made by Player 1. Then fold the decision sheet in half, so that nobody can see your choices, and we will come to collect them.

[The experimenter and assistants collect the decision sheets, which depict graphically the following allocations and questions:

1. If Player 1 offered you Rs 1000 and kept Rs 0 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
2. If Player 1 offered you Rs 900 and kept Rs 100 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
3. If Player 1 offered you Rs 800 and kept Rs 200 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
4. If Player 1 offered you Rs 700 and kept Rs 300 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
5. If Player 1 offered you Rs 600 and kept Rs 400 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
6. If Player 1 offered you Rs 500 and kept Rs 500 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
7. If Player 1 offered you Rs 400 and kept Rs 600 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
8. If Player 1 offered you Rs 300 and kept Rs 700 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
9. If Player 1 offered you Rs 200 and kept Rs 800 for him or herself would you accept or reject?
10. If Player 1 offered you Rs 100 and kept Rs 900 for him or herself would you accept or reject?

11. If Player 1 offered you Rs 0 and kept Rs 1000 for him or herself would you accept or reject?]

We will now perform another tasks/We will now take a break. [Researcher's name] will pay you for this task [point to the pile of envelopes to demonstrate the amount] after we finish all the tasks, if this task is the one selected to be paid.

Instructions for Norm Elicitation game (Task 5)

For this task, I will read to you descriptions of a series of situations. These descriptions correspond to situations in which one person, a woman, must make a decision. For each situation, you will be given a description of the decision faced by the woman. After I read to you the description of the decision, I will describe a choice that the woman might have made, and you should decide whether making that choice would be “socially appropriate” or “socially inappropriate” . By socially appropriate, we mean behavior that is consistent with moral or proper behavior, that is, behavior that most people agree is the “correct” or “moral” thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that, if someone were to make a socially inappropriate choice, then someone observing the person’s behavior might think poorly of that person or even get angry at that person.

In each of your responses, we would like you to answer as truthfully as possible, based on your opinions of what constitutes socially appropriate or socially inappropriate behavior.

To give you an idea of how the experiment will proceed, we will go through an example and show you how you will indicate your responses. I will now read to you an example of a situation. These cards that I am holding illustrate the situation and the decision sheet. [Experimenter illustrates the situation using a vignette, to make it easier for subjects to understand the situation].

Someone is at a local grocery store. While there, the person notices that someone has left a wallet/bag on the counter. How appropriate would it be to take the wallet for yourself?

If this were the situation we asked you about in the study, you would indicate the extent to which you believe taking the wallet would be "socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate" . Recall that by socially appropriate we mean behavior that most people agree is the "correct" or "moral" thing to do.

You should indicate your choice by filling the decision sheet [Hold up a reproduction of the decision sheet, where the answers are pictured using smiley faces/thumbs up or down]. As you can see, the decision sheet has four symbols on it:

- 2 thumbs down, corresponding to “very socially inappropriate”
- 1 thumb down, corresponding to “somewhat socially inappropriate”
- 1 thumb up, corresponding to “somewhat socially appropriate”
- and 2 thumbs up, corresponding to “very socially appropriate”.

This is to help you recognize and remember what each of these options mean.

For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate. Then, you would indicate your response by selecting the last symbol, the one with the two thumbs down on the decision sheet.

Are there any questions about this example situation or about how to indicate your responses? I will now read to you several situations, all dealing with decisions that a woman might have to make. I will illustrate these

situations using vignettes. For each of the choices, I would like you to think whether making that choice is very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate for a woman to make. To indicate your response, you would place a check mark on the corresponding symbol on the decision sheet [Hold up reproduction of decision sheet again].

How will you get paid for this task? If this task is the one selected to be paid, we will pay you Rs 250 for each of your answers that matches the answer of someone in the other room, in addition to your participation fee. For instance, suppose the example situation above is part of this task, and this task is selected to be paid.

- Suppose your response was "somewhat socially appropriate,". Then you will receive Rs 250 for this question if the answer given by the person in the other room is also "somewhat socially appropriate".
- Suppose your response was "socially inappropriate". Then you will receive Rs 250 for this question if the answer given by the person in the other room is also "socially inappropriate".

Otherwise you would receive only the Rs 1000 participation fee.

Who is the person in the other room, whose answers is compared to your to determine your earnings from this task? It is a different person for each different question. We will explain exactly who this person is when we present each situation.

Do you have any questions? If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to you.

Question 1

We will now describe the first situation.

Imagine that a woman can buy a scarf for herself using money she has been given by her parents as a gift. She wants to buy a scarf. Her husband offers to go and buy the scarf for her. She can let the husband go shopping for her, or she can go herself. She decides to go shopping by herself.

How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to buy the scarf by herself? Do you think her decision is very socially appropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate or very socially inappropriate? Tick the corresponding box in the answer sheet in front of you.

You will receive Rs 250 for this question only if your answer matches that of a randomly selected person in the other room, different from your spouse.

Question 2

I will now tell you about another situation, also dealing with a decision that a woman might have to make. Again, I would like you to think whether making that choice is very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, you would place a check mark on the corresponding symbol on the decision sheet.

Imagine that a woman is running a business from her home. At the end of the month, she has some profits to re-invest. She can ask her husband to re-invest them for her, or she can choose herself, without consulting him. She decides to re-invest her profits in what she thinks best, without consulting her husband.

How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to make the investment decision on her own? Do you think her decision is very socially appropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate or very socially inappropriate? Tick the corresponding box in the answer sheet in front of you.

You will receive Rs 250 for this question only if your answer matches that of a randomly selected person in the other room, different from your spouse.

Question 3

We will now describe another situation. This situation is the same as the first one, only this time your payment for this question is determined in a different way, so pay attention.

Imagine that a woman can buy a piece of clothing for herself, using money she has been given by her parents as a gift. She wants to buy a scarf. Her husband offers to go and buy the scarf for her. She can let the husband go shopping for her, or she can go herself. She decides to go shopping by herself.

How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to buy the scarf by herself? Do you think her decision is very socially appropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate or very socially inappropriate? Tick the corresponding box in the answer sheet in front of you.

You will receive Rs 250 for this question only if your answer matches that of your spouse in the other room. So note the difference with respect to the first question: there, you would get paid if your answer matched that of a randomly selected person in the other room, different from your spouse. Now, you will get paid for this question if your answer matched that of your spouse in the other room.

Question 4

We will now describe another situation. This situation is the same as the second one, only this time your payment for this question is determined in a different way, so pay attention.

Imagine that a woman is running a business from her home. At the end of the month, she has some profits to re-invest. She can ask her husband to re-invest them for her, or she can choose herself, without consulting him. She decides to re-invest her profits in what she thinks best, without consulting her husband.

How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to make the investment decision on her own? Do you think her decision is very socially appropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate or very socially inappropriate? Tick the corresponding box in the answer sheet in front of you.

You will receive Rs 250 for this question only if your answer matches that of your spouse in the other room. So note the difference with respect to the first question: there, you would get paid if your answer matched that of a randomly selected person in the other room, different from your spouse. Now, you will get paid for this question if your answer matched that of your spouse in the other room.

Final Instructions

We have now completed all the tasks. We will now draw one number from this bag to determine which task will be paid [ask one participant to draw a number in front of all other subjects. If task 2, 3 or 4 is drawn, then toss a coin to determine whether they will be paid as Player 1 or 2].

We will now call you one by one to give you your payment. Then you are free to leave.

Thank you all very much for participating in today's activities! Please don't hesitate to ask us questions if you have doubts before you leave.

D.2 Second Laboratory Experiment

The study population differs from that of LAB1, in that the experiments were carried out in rural villages in Faisalabad, Punjab (Pakistan). This sample represents agriculture-dependent, low-income households. We conducted 30 lab-in-field sessions in 15 rural villages across Faisalabad. At the time of invitation, all couples were given basic information on the experiment and details on the time, date, and expected duration of the session (2-3 hours).²

Each married couple was also informed of the compensation and expected earnings from participation: a participation fee of Rs. 500 (\$5) (i.e., Rs. 1000 per couple), provided that they stayed for the entire duration of the session; and additional earnings of at most Rs. 1000 (\$10). Informed consent was collected from all participants before the start of each session, and payments were made individually and privately at the end. Individual surveys were conducted at the end of the experiment session. The sequence of events at participant arrival was as follows:

Sequence of events during experiment sessions

- Upon arrival, subject pairs are assigned to their respective gender-specific room.
- No contact is allowed between subjects during the entire experiment. Men and women are seated in separate rooms. Respondents in the same room are seated in compartments separated by cardboard sheets. Contact between subjects in the same room is strongly discouraged but not impossible.
- Each subject in the stranger matching treatment is assigned a partner; this is done without replacement, which means that all subjects in the stranger treatment have one partner and one partner only; by construction, the partner is not the household member they came with
- Subjects in each session played each task one with the spouse and once with a ‘stranger’ as the partner. The stranger could be of three types - stranger of the opposite gender, stranger of the same gender, or paired with a ‘computer’ that uses numbers generated from a random number generating program. ‘Strangers’ were randomly allocated at the session level as follows:

Stranger type	Session No.
Stranger: opposite gender	3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28
Stranger: same gender	1, 2, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 30
Computer	5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 23, 25, 27

- Dictator task is always conducted first, with individuals playing as Player 1 or Player 2 in random order. The dictator task has two rounds - one played with the spouse as a partner, one played with a ‘stranger’. In each round, Player 1 allocates a share of a Rs 1000 (\approx \$10) endowment received from the research team to Player 2. The order of rounds is randomized as follows:

Order of round	Session No.
Spouse round, then stranger round	1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29
Stranger round, then spouse round	3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 22, 25, 28, 30

² Each experimental session was held in a central location, at less than 10 minutes drive via public transport

- Preferences task is always played second. The task is played twice, once with the spouse as a partner and once with a stranger as the partner, with stranger type randomized on at a session level as summarized above. The following steps are taken in each round:
 1. Participants are given a menu of three food - *biryani*, *chicken tikka boti* and *zarda* (sweet rice), and three drink item - water, soft drink (coke), rooh afza (local sweet drink), to choose from for their lunch at the end of the session. Participants were asked to both highlight one food and one drink item they would like to consume and cross out the food and drink items that they do not want to consume.
 2. Participants are asked to guess their partner's preferences, earning Rs 50 if they guess either the food or the drink correctly and Rs 100 if they guess both.
 3. Participants are asked to select a food and drink item for their partners to consume at lunch. Half of the subjects are randomly assigned to the information treatment, done by pair ID codes assigned at the start of the treatment. [This step is not conducted with those paired with a 'computer'.]
 4. Participants are asked to select from two options: either consume the food and drink the partner has selected for you OR pay a nominal cost (Rs 5/20/50, randomly drawn out) from their participation fee to consume their own choice for sure.
 5. One round - spouse or stranger pairing, will be selected at random and participant's final choice will be implemented for serving lunch at the end of the session.
- A norms elicitation task is conducted. Respondents are asked to mark hypothetical decisions regarding spouse and others, against a scale of "appropriateness". The order of questions is randomized.
- Participants are served lunch.
- Individual surveys are conducted
- One round of the dictator task is randomly selected for payment via a coin toss. Participants receive a fixed participation fee + earnings from the dictator task.

We reproduce below the full protocol used in the experiment. The text below was read in Urdu to all participating subjects during the experiment. Square brackets [] contain instructions for enumerators.

Introduction to the community

Thank you all for taking the time to be here today. My name is [experimenter's name], and I will be facilitating this meeting. Helping me today, we also have here [introduce everyone]. Before we start, we would like to remind you that we will give you ____ as a compensation for your time, if you decide to participate. This ____ is not a part of the activity and is yours to keep. We will give you ____ at the end of the meeting, together with any other sum you will earn through the activities.

Purpose: Today, we will conduct several activities in your community. The purpose of these activities is to better understand how people in this community make decisions. The results of the study may eventually be published or part of a book. It is not part of a development project of any sort. Your community and other communities around Faisalabad were selected to participate from a large group of potential communities.

Activities

We will perform several tasks here today. For these activities, we will select 24 participants. In a moment, I will explain how we will select the participants. Before that, I want to make some general comments. The participants will be performing some tasks in exchange for real money that they will be able to take home. You should understand that this is not my money. It is money given to me by Lahore School, to use to conduct a research study. As we told you when we invited you to come here, the meeting may take 3 hours, so if you think you will not be able to stay that long without leaving please let us know now. [Couples who cannot stay for the length of the meeting should leave before they enter the lottery to participate. They do not get paid, as stated in the invitation] Those of you who cannot stay can leave now. Thank you all for taking the time to come today.

- We only need 24 individuals to participate in these tasks. Thus, unfortunately, not all of you will be able to participate.
- We will have a lottery to determine who will participate.
- To complete the lottery, we will take the coupon you came with today, which has your name on, and fold the coupon in half.
- Next, we will place your folded coupon of paper in this bag.
- This means that we need one coupon for each couple present here today.
- We will then ask one of you to draw 12 pieces of paper from this bag containing your coupons.
- Those whose names will be drawn will stay here and participate in the tasks, while the others will go home.
- We will give another coupon to those of you who will not be drawn to participate today: this coupon will guarantee that you will participate, if you come to a future meeting
- When we give you this coupon, we will show you the dates of the future meetings, so that you can tell us when you would like to come again

Is this clear to everyone? Does anyone have any questions on how we will select the 24 participants?

[Set aside the people with the coupons, collecting the coupons from them. Then proceed with the random draw of names.]

Those of you, whose names have not been called, can leave now. Thank you all for taking the time to come today.

[Pay show up fee to all subjects who have to leave (hand out pre-prepared envelopes containing ____ to each individual in the couple and have them sign a receipt). Then, after people have left, proceed]

We will now ask you to draw a name tag from this bag. This name tag will determine your ID for the activities. You are given an ID to preserve your anonymity: your name will not be kept anywhere in our records, only your ID.

Consent

- Before we begin, I will explain the basic activities we will do together, and the rules that we will follow.
- Read Consent Statement:

If you wish to participate, please say, “I do. If you do not wish to participate, please advise us. You will be free to leave then. You will not be able to stay in the activity room(s) if you do not wish to participate.

You will be matched with a partner for some of the tasks that you will perform today. We will explain more about your partner later.

We will now take all women to one room, and all men to another room. Please follow [Assistant’s name] if you are a woman, or [Assistant’s name] if you are a man.

[Take the selected participants into the rooms and have them sit. The Assistant directs each subject to her allocated seat.]

Welcome, and thank you again.

- Before we proceed any further, let me stress something that is very important. Many of you were invited here without understanding very much about what we are planning to do today. If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any reason, you are of course free to leave at anytime. If you do choose to leave, you won’t be able to come back into the activity room(s) until everyone is finished performing all the activities.
- Before we start, please make sure your mobile phones are switched off, to avoid interruptions during the meeting.
- If you have heard about activities that have been conducted here in the past you should try to forget everything that you have been told. These are completely different tasks.
- Please also be advised, there are no right or wrong choices, so you should choose whatever you think is best for yourself and not look at your neighbor’s choices. It is important to remember that not everyone will win the same amount in the task. Everyone will still receive the ____ payment for participation, regardless of how much you win in the task

- We are about to begin. It is important that you listen as carefully as possible to the instructions, because only people who understand the tasks will actually be able to perform them. I will run through some examples to make sure you understand.
- You cannot ask questions out loud or talk about the tasks with anyone else while we are here together.
- If you have questions at any time during the meeting, please raise your hand and ask, and we will come to you and answer them in private.
- I will read through a script to explain all the activities that we will perform here today. As you may know, these activities are conducted in other localities beside this one, so it is very important that people in every locality receive exactly the same information, and this is the reason why I must read from this script.

NO TALKING

- I will now say something very important. You cannot ask questions out loud or talk about the tasks with anyone else while we are here together.
- If you need to ask a question at any time, please raise your hand and I will come to you so I can answer your question privately.
- I will explain the tasks, do demonstrations, and let you practice the tasks before we perform them for real. These demonstrations and practices are to help you understand the rules and clarify any questions.
- Please be sure that you obey these rules because it is possible for one person to spoil the tasks for everyone by talking in front of the group. If this happens, we will not be able to continue forward with the tasks today and you will not be paid for the tasks.
- Is this clear to everyone? Does anyone have any questions so far about what will go on today?

[If anyone asks a question out loud, explain again that all questions must be asked in private].

REAL PAYMENT

- In today's activities, you will have the opportunity to receive a cash payment. The amount that you will receive depends on your decisions and on the decisions of others. It also depends on what task is selected to be paid.
- Remember that at the end of all the activities, we will draw a number from a hat. That number will determine for which task you will be paid. This means that each task that you perform has the same chance of being selected to be paid.
- Remember also, that in addition to what you will earn from the activities, each of you will receive Rs 150 for participating in today's meeting. This money is yours, regardless of what happens during the activities. It will be paid to you in cash together with your earnings from the activities.
- It is real money, which you will be allowed to keep for yourself or do what you wish. This money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the meeting.
- During the activities you will make your decisions using paper slips [show slips], each representing Rs 100. These paper slips will be converted into cash when you get paid at the end of the meeting.

CONFIDENTIALITY

- Your decisions and your payment are private and confidential. Nobody, apart from a member of our team will know what you earned, and he/she will not tell anyone.
- We will put up these partitions between you every time you have to take a decision. You will make your decisions behind the partitions, so that nobody else can see what you decide.

Instructions for dictator game, round 1 (Task 1)

We are now ready to begin the first task. Let me remind you that you may not ask questions or talk while you are here in the group. If you have any questions, you may raise your hand and I (the enumerator) or my assistant(s) will come answer your question privately.

INTRODUCTION

- This task is performed by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2.
- Researcher [name] will provide Rs 1000 to Player 1 in each pair of players.
- Player 1 must decide how to divide this money between him or herself and Player 2. Player 1 must allocate between Rs 0 and the total Rs 1000 to Player 2.
- Player 2 takes home whatever Player 1 allocates to him or her, and Player 1 takes home whatever he or she does not allocate to Player 2.
- If spouse matching performed first: In this task, your spouse will be your partner.
- If stranger matching performed first: In this task, your partner will be the [stranger of the same gender/stranger of the opposite gender/computer – as randomized for the session] you were paired with in the previous task.
- Notice, your partner will also be making a decision for the allocation of this money.
- This means that you will all perform one round as Player 1 and one round as Player 2. You will first perform the task as Player 1, and then perform the task as Player 2.
- How will we choose whether to pay you for this task, and whether to pay you as Player 1 or Player 2? After we have finished performing all the tasks, we will first draw a number from the hat [show again numbers and hat] to determine which task will be paid. If we draw the number 1 from the hat, then it means that this task is the one selected for payment. If so, we will toss a coin: if heads come up then you will be paid as Player 1; if tails come up, we will pay you as Player 2.
- Is this clear to everyone? Please raise your hands if you have any questions and I will come and answer them privately.

We will now run through 5 examples to show you how the task might be performed.

[Notes: the researchers and assistants work through the examples and test questions with paper slips, each representing a Rs 100 note. They also take from and place the paper slips into two envelopes identical to the ones to be given to subjects, so as to demonstrate fully what subjects have to do. Each of the examples

presented below is presented either as an example or used as a test question as required. If more test questions are needed the researcher or assistant begin again with the first example above. The script below is written assuming that 6 more examples were given, 3 presented as test scenarios/practice rounds, i.e., the subjects are asked questions about the amounts the subjects would take home. The 11 examples/tests, 5 above, 6 below, cover the full set of possible choices for Player 1.]

1. Here is the Rs1000. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs900 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs900 and Player 1 will go home with Rs100 (Rs1000 minus Rs900 equals Rs100).
2. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs200 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs200 and Player 1 will go home with Rs800 (Rs1000 minus Rs200 equals Rs800).
3. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs500 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs500 and Player 1 will go home with Rs500 (Rs1000 minus Rs500 equals Rs500).
4. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs700 to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with Rs700 and Player 1 will go home with Rs300 (Rs1000 minus Rs700 equals Rs300).
5. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate zero to Player 2. Then, Player 2 will go home with zero and Player 1 will go home with Rs1000 (Rs1000 minus zero equals Rs1000).

[The experimenter and assistants hand out two envelopes for each subject. Each envelope features the subject's ID. The two envelopes are of different color. Moreover, Player 1's envelope has a 1 [2] written on it.]

We will now practice the task together. You will first practice the task as Player 1. You have been handed two envelopes. The red [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines Player 1's payment. The other envelope, the white [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine the payment to Player 2. As we work through the following examples, please put the paper slips into the empty envelope as indicated by the examples. We will walk around the room to check if your allocation matches the one from the example. This is important; because it allows us to make sure that everyone understands the task and how to make the decision.

Here are some more examples [The experiment assistants go around the room to check that subjects correctly place the paper slips into the envelopes. The experimenter explains the task again if mistakes are discovered]:

1. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs1000 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs1000 and Player 1 will go home with zero (Rs1000 minus Rs1000 equals zero).]
2. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs400 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs400 and Player 1 will go home with Rs600 (Rs1000 minus Rs400 equals Rs600).]
3. Here is another example. Imagine that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs600 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. How much will Player 2 go home with? And how much will Player 1 go home with? [Player 2 will go home with Rs600 and Player 1 will go home with Rs400 (Rs1000 minus Rs600 equals Rs400).]

4. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs100 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs900] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs100]
5. Now try this one. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs800 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs200] And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs800].
6. Now try this one. Suppose that Player 1 chooses to allocate Rs300 to Player 2. Please place the paper slips into the blue envelope corresponding to this decision. In this case, how much will Player 1 go home with? [Rs700]. And how much will Player 2 go home with? [Rs300].

We will now conduct the task for real. You will now perform the task as Player 1. Remember, your partner in this round is:

- If spouse matching performed first: your spouse
- If stranger matching performed first: the [stranger of the same gender/stranger of the opposite gender/computer as randomized for the session] you were paired with in the previous task.

You have been handed two envelopes. The yellow [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines your payment. The other envelope, the blue [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine the payment to Player 2. Please put the paper slips you want to give to Player 2 in the empty envelope. Please make sure your choice is not observed by others in the room.

You must now wait while the rest of the players, finish performing the task. Then we will play the second round of this task, where you are Player 2. [The experimenter and assistants collect the envelopes.]

[For Player 2s] You will now perform the task as Player 2. As Player 2, you have no decision to make. Player 1 who has been matched with you has allocated a sum of money to you. After we finish performing all the activities, if this task and the role of Player 2 is the one selected to be paid I will pay you what Player 1 has allocated to you.

Instructions for dictator game, round 2

We will now perform another task. This task is the same as the previous one, except that your partner for this task is:

- If spouse matching performed second: your spouse
- If stranger matching performed second: the [stranger of the same gender/stranger of the opposite gender/computer as randomized for the session] you were paired with in the previous task.

Again, you will all perform one round as Player 1 and one round as Player 2. You will first perform the task as Player 1, and then perform the task as Player 2.

How will we choose whether to pay you for this task, and whether to pay you as Player 1 or Player 2? After we have finished performing all the tasks, we will first draw a number from the hat [show again numbers and hat] to determine which task will be paid. If we draw the number 2 from the hat, then it means that this task is

the one selected for payment. If so, we will toss a coin: if heads come up then you will be paid as Player 1; if tails come up, we will pay you as Player 2.

Do you have questions on the task? [If there are questions: repeat instructions from introduction of task 1, and provide examples as needed].

Let's play the task for real. You have been handed two envelopes. The yellow [or other color] one with 10 paper slips in it is the one that determines your payment. The other envelope, the blue [or other color] one, is empty and the paper slips you put in it will determine the payment to Player 2. Please put the paper slips you want to give to Player 2 in the empty envelope.

Please make sure your choice is not observed by others in the room.

You must now wait while the rest of the players, finish performing the task. Then we will play the second round of this task, where you are Player 2.

[The experimenter and assistants collect the envelopes.]

[For Player 2] You will now perform the task as Player 2. As Player 2, you have no decision to make. Player 1 who has been matched with you has allocated a sum of money to you. After we finish performing all the activities, if this task and the role of Player 2 is the one selected to be paid I will pay you what Player 1 has allocated to you.

Instructions for preferences game (Task 2)

We are now ready to begin with the second task. Let me remind you that you may not ask questions or talk while you are here in the group. If you have any questions, you may raise your hand and I (the enumerator) or my assistant(s) will come answer your question privately. Please be sure to listen to the instructions carefully. This is NOT the same task that you just performed, so be sure to listen to the instructions carefully.

- This task is performed by pairs of individuals.
- Each of you will perform this task twice, once with your spouse (or your household member) and once with an anonymous partner.

[Enumerator: There are three types of anonymous partners. Each session will have only one kind. Please give instructions for the partner type according to the type specified for that session.]

- Stranger - other room treatment: You will be paired with a stranger in the other room i.e. of the opposite gender. None of you will know exactly with whom you are paired. Only [researcher's name] knows who is matched with whom, and she/he will never tell anyone.
- Stranger - same room treatment: You will be paired with a person in this room i.e. another male/female. Only [researcher's name] knows who is matched with whom, and she/he will never tell anyone.
- Computer treatment: You will be paired with the computer. This means that the partner's decisions will be the result of a random draw by the computer, which will appear on the computer screen and be communicated to the researcher.

Do you have questions on who your partner will be in this task? If you have questions, please raise your hand and I will come to you to answer your question privately.

The decisions that you will take as part of this task concern what you would like to have for lunch. We will be serving you lunch at the end of the session, to thank you for spending part of your day with us.

PART 1:

I have three different food items here today: *biryani* (savory), *chicken tikka boti* and *zarda* (sweet rice). I also have three different types of drinks: soft drink (coke), rooh afza and water. Before we begin this task, please have a look at these food items (without tasting) and select which food item you would most like to eat and what you would like to drink at lunch today. Please circle the food item and drink you would most prefer to have for lunch today, and cross out the food item and drink that you would least prefer to have for lunch today. You cannot rank two items equally. Once you have had a look at the items, we will ask you record your ranking on the sheet we will provide you. Remember, you may get for lunch the items that you circle. Distribute a sheet with pictures of the 3 (or as many) food items] Does anyone have any questions? Please raise your hand and my assistant or I will come and address your query.

[Subjects should circle=most preferred, cross-out=least preferred. The assistants collect the ranking sheets. While the experimenter proceeds with Part 2, the assistant(s) enters the rankings.]

ROUND 1: Spouse preferences (randomize order between spouse and anonymous): Your partner in this round is your family member, who you came with today. Your partner in the other room has also been asked to pick what food item and drink s/he would like to have for lunch. We would like you to guess your partner's pick. We will now distribute a sheet, where you can write your guess. Circle what you guess is your partner's preferred food item and drink for lunch today. We will give you Rs. 50 for correctly guessing the food or drink ranked as most preferred by your partner and Rs 100 if you guess both food and drink item preferred by your partner correctly. This money will be paid to you at the end of all activities, on top of your other earnings from the other tasks.

[Distribute another sheet with pictures of the 3 food items and 3 drinks. Subjects should circle=most preferred. The assistants collect the guessed partner's ranking sheets. While the experimenter proceeds with Part 3, the assistant(s) enter the guessed rankings.]

PART 2 [KNOW PARTNER'S RANKING treatment only]: Now, we will distribute to you a sheet, containing the ranking given by your partner, capturing his or her own preferences for the 3 foods items and 3 drinks.

[The experimenter and assistants distribute to participants the partner's ranking sheet. Provide this information to each participant with an odd number ID.]

PART 3: Now I would like for you to:

- Choose a food item and a drink for your partner to consume. It does not have to be the same items that you chose for yourself. [Say to KNOW PARTNER'S RANKING treatment individuals only:] It also need not be the items your partner selected for him/herself, if you know them.
- In the other room, your partner is being asked to do the same.
- Your preferred food and drink are what you circled earlier.
- Neither you nor your partner will be able to exchange the food item and drink you are given with anyone else.

Shall we begin? Does anyone have any questions? Please raise your hand and my assistant or I will come and address your query.

We will now distribute a decision sheet, where you can mark your choice of what food item and drink that you would like your PARTNER to consume

[Distribute a decision sheet, with space to record one choice for food and one choice for drink for the partner].

Please circle the food item and the drink that you would like your PARTNER to consume in the sheet of paper in front of you and fold it to let us know you are done. My assistants and I will come and collect your decision sheet.

ROUND 2- Anonymous partner preferences:

We will now repeat the activities we performed in round 1, only with a different partner. Remember, your partner in this round is (Enumerator: please announce according to the partner specified for that session),

- Stranger other room treatment: a person sitting in the next room. We will never reveal to you who this person is, and we will never reveal to this person that you have been matched with them. This will be kept completely secret.
- Stranger same room treatment: a person sitting in this room. We will never reveal to you who this person is, and we will never reveal to this person that you have been matched with them. This will be kept completely secret.
- Computer treatment: the computer, whose decisions are determined by a program generating random numbers.

[Computer treatment] The computer generated a random ranking of the food items and drinks, selecting at random one most preferred food and drink and one least preferred food item and drink. We have recorded that ranking.

[Other matching treatments] Recall that in the previous round, we asked each participant to rank the food items and drinks from most preferred to least preferred. We have kept those rankings.

We now would like you to guess your partner's ranking. We will distribute a sheet, where you can write your guess. Circle what you guess is your partner's preferred food item and drink. We will give you Rs. 50 for correctly guessing the food item or drink ranked as most preferred by your partner and Rs 100 if you guess both food and drink item preferred by your partner correctly. This money will be paid to you at the end of all activities, on top of your earnings from the other tasks.

[Distribute another sheet with pictures of the 3 food items and three drinks. Subjects should circle=most preferred, cross-out=least preferred. The assistants collect the guessed partner's ranking sheets. While the experimenter proceeds with Part 3, the assistant(s) enter the guessed rankings. These guesses are compared with the actual partner's ranking at the end of the session, when computing the payments]

PART 3: Now I would like for you to:

- For STRANGER SAME or OTHER ROOM ONLY: Choose a food item and a drink for your partner to consume. It does not have to be the same items that you chose for yourself. [KNOW PARTNER'S RANKING treatment individuals only:] It also need not be the items your partner selected for him/herself, if you know them.
- Your partner is being asked to do the same.

- Your preferred food and drink are what you circled earlier.
- Neither you nor your partner will be able to exchange the food item and drink you are given with anyone else.

Shall we begin? Does anyone have any questions? Please raise your hand and my assistant or I will come and address your query.

[For STRANGER SAME or OTHER ROOM ONLY:] We will now distribute a decision sheet, where you can mark your choice of what food item and drink that you would like your PARTNER to consume [Distribute a decision sheet, with space to record one choice for food and one choice for drink for the partner]. Please circle the food item and the drink that you would like your PARTNER to consume in the sheet of paper in front of you and fold it to let us know you are done. My assistants and I will come and collect your decision sheet.

PART 4

- We will now ask you to choose between two options: either you receive the food item and drink that your partner from round 1 or round 2 has picked for you; or you pay [Enumerator: this amount is randomized across sessions]. Rs. (5/20/50)- from your show-up fee and get your own choice of food and drink . We will do this twice. First, we will first ask you to make this choice with your partner from round 1, that is, the household member with whom you came/anonymous partner. Second, we will ask you to make this choice for the partner assigned to you in round 2. The person you came with will be asked to make similar decisions, but we will not reveal to that person or anyone else any of the choices you make.
- When you have made your choice for your partner in rounds 1 and 2, we will then select one of the two rounds at random and implement what you have decided. If the selected round is round 1, you will receive the food item and drink that your accompanying household member has selected for you, unless you agreed to pay Rs. (5/20/50) from your show-up fee to receive your own choice. If the selected round is round 2, you will receive the food item and drink that your unknown partner has selected for you, unless you agreed to pay Rs. (5/20/50) from your show-up fee to receive your own choice.
- You will only need to pay Rs. (5/20/50) for the selected round. For instance, suppose that you selected to pay Rs. (5/20/50) to get your own choice only with the round 1 partner AND round 2 is selected. In this case, you will receive what the round 2 partner selected for you and you will pay nothing. Alternatively, if you selected to pay Rs. (5/20/50) for round 1 and round 2 partners, you will pay Rs. (5/20/50) and you will receive your own choice for sure.
- We will not reveal to anyone the outcome of the coin toss that selects between your final decisions between round 1 and round 2.

We will now call you one by one to the back of the room to record your final decisions in privacy.

[At individual meetings. The experimenter has two decision sheets in front of him: the one with the subject's own pick (face up) and the one with the round 1 partner's pick for him/her (face down, folded to conceal id)]. Here I have the sheet with your most preferred and least preferred food item and drink, and another sheet with what was selected for you by your partner from round 1 (your spouse). You can either choose to have what your partner picked for you, or you can give Rs. (5/20/50) from your show-up fee of Rs. 500 and have your own choice. What is your decision?

Enumerator: Write down Decision 1

Now I will tell you what your partner has picked for you. What do you think your partner has picked for you? Your partner picked ____ and ____ for you. Would you like to change your earlier decision?

Enumerator: Note revised decision as Decision 2

[Repeat explanation of options if necessary. Record decision for Round 1.]

Now, I will ask you about Round 2, where you were matched to a random stranger. At the end we will toss a coin to decide whether we implement your decision for round 1 or round 2.

[The experimenter now has two decision sheets in front of him: the one with the subject's own pick (face up), as before; and the one with the round 2 partner's pick for him/her (face down, folded to conceal id)] Here I have the sheet with your most preferred and least preferred food item and drink, and another sheet with what was selected for you by your randomly assigned partner from round 2. You can either choose to have what your partner picked for you, or you can give Rs. (5/20/50) from your show-up fee of Rs. 500 and have your own choice. What is your decision? [Enumerator: Please refer to the session randomization list to find out what the cost is for each participant.]

Enumerator: Write down Decision 3 (own or partner choice)

Now I will tell you what your partner has picked for you. What do you think your partner has picked for you?

Enumerator: Note guess 2 of partner's choice of food item ____ and drink ____

Your partner picked ____ and ____ for you. Would you like to change your earlier decision?

Enumerator: Note revised decision as Decision 4 (yes/no)

[Repeat explanation of options if necessary. Record decision for Round 2.].

[Enumerator: If decision 2 and 4 are the same, then Skip the coin toss]. Coin toss: Now we will toss a coin to select between the 2 rounds of this task. If the coin toss falls on heads, we will implement your final decision for round 1. If the coin toss falls on tails, we will implement your final decision for round 2.

Enumerator: Note outcome of coin toss.

Some of our team members will now prepare the food items based on the decisions. Meanwhile we will continue with the rest of the planned activities.

[Record decision for Round 1 and Round 2. When all subjects have made their decision, the assistant enters the coin toss data]

Instructions for Norm Elicitation game (Task 3)

For this task, I will read to you descriptions of a series of situations. These descriptions correspond to situations in which a person must make a decision. For each situation, you will be given a description of the decision faced by an individual. After I read to you the description of the decision, I will describe a choice that the individual might have made, and you should decide whether making that choice would be "acceptable" and "consistent with proper social or moral behavior" or "unacceptable" and "inconsistent with proper social or moral behavior. By acceptable, we mean behavior that most people agree is the "correct" or "ethical" thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that, if someone were to make an unacceptable choice, then someone observing this behavior might get angry at the person who made the choice for acting in that manner.

In each of your responses, we would like you to answer as truthfully as possible, based on your opinions of what constitutes socially appropriate or socially inappropriate behavior.

To give you an idea of how the experiment will proceed, we will go through an example and show you how you will indicate your responses. I will now read to you an example of a situation. These cards that I am holding illustrate the situation and the decision sheet. [Experimenter illustrates the situation using a vignette, to make it easier for subjects to understand the situation].

Someone is at a local grocery store. While there, the person notices that someone has left a wallet/bag on the counter. How appropriate would it be to take the wallet?

If this were the situation we asked you about in the study, you would indicate the extent to which you believe taking the wallet would be “acceptable” and “consistent with proper social or moral behavior” or “unacceptable” and “inconsistent with proper social or moral behavior”. Recall that by socially appropriate we mean behavior that most people agree is the ‘correct’ or ‘ethical’ thing to do.

You should indicate your choice by filling the decision sheet [Hold up a reproduction of the decision sheet, where the answers are pictured using thumbs up or down]. As you can see, the decision sheet has four symbols on it:

- 2 thumbs down, corresponding to “very unacceptable”
- 1 thumb down, corresponding to “somewhat unacceptable”
- 1 thumb up, corresponding to “somewhat acceptable”
- 2 thumbs up, corresponding to “very acceptable”.

This is to help you recognize and remember what each of these options mean. For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very unacceptable. Then, you would indicate your response by selecting the first symbol, the one with the two thumbs down on the decision sheet.

Are there any questions about this example situation or about how to indicate your responses? I will now read to you several situations, all dealing with decisions that you may have to make regarding your spouse, strangers or the researchers. I will illustrate these situations using vignettes. For each of the choices, I would like you to think whether making that choice is very unacceptable, somewhat unacceptable, somewhat acceptable and very acceptable. To indicate your response, you would place a check mark on the corresponding symbol on the decision sheet [Hold up reproduction of decision sheet again].

Participants have to answer ALL questions regardless of who they are matched with.

[Randomize order of 1, 2,3,4; randomize order of a and b]

Question 1a: (Spouse) “Is it acceptable to pick a snack for your spouse that is different from what you know they prefer.

[The assistants hand out the decision sheet, with a short description of the situation (picking a snack) and the appropriateness rating]

[After participants have noted their opinions, read out the next statement and ask them rate it]

Question 1b: (Spouse) “Is it acceptable for you to pick for yourself a snack that is different from what your spouse picked for you.

[The assistants hand out the decision sheet, with a short description of the situation (picking a snack) and the appropriateness rating]

[After participants have noted their opinions, read out the next statement and ask them to rate it]

Question 2a: (non-household members/strangers of opposite gender). “Is it acceptable to pick a snack for a man/woman (opposite gender) in the other room from outside your household that is different from what you know they prefer”

[The assistants hand out the decision sheet, with a short description of the situation (picking a snack) and the appropriateness rating.]

[After participants have noted their opinions, read out the next statement and ask them rate it.]

Question 2b: (non-household members/strangers of opposite gender). “Is it acceptable for you to pick for yourself a snack that is different from what a man/woman (opposite gender) in the other room from outside your household has picked for you”.

[The assistants hand out the decision sheet, with a short description of the situation (picking a snack) and the appropriateness rating.]

[After participants have noted their opinions, read out the next statement and ask them rate it.]

Question 3a: (non-household members/strangers of the same gender). “Is it acceptable to pick a snack for a man/woman (same gender) in the this room from outside your household that is different from what you know they prefer”

[The assistants hand out the decision sheet, with a short description of the situation (picking a snack) and the appropriateness rating.]

[After participants have noted their opinions, read out the next statement and ask them rate it.]

Question 3b: (non-household members/strangers of the same gender). “Is it acceptable for you to pick for yourself a snack that is different from what a man/woman (same gender) in the this room from outside your household has picked for you”.

[The assistants hand out the decision sheet, with a short description of the situation (picking a snack) and the appropriateness rating.]

[After participants have noted their opinions, read out the next statement and ask them rate it.]

Final Instructions

This was the last activity. We will now compute your earnings and distribute them to you. While you are distributed your lunch, we will ask you a short questionnaire.

In order to compute your payment, we have to determine whether you will be paid for Task 1 or Task 2, and whether you will be paid for your decisions as Player 1 or Player 2. Recall that we said we would draw a number from a bag to determine which task you will be paid for, and would toss a coin to decide whether you would be paid as Player 1 or Player 2.

We will therefore ask the enumerator outside to draw the number and then toss a coin: if heads come up then you will be paid as Player 1; if tails come up, we will pay you as Player 2. We will also use a coin toss to determine if you get payment from round 1 or round 2 of task 1. We will inform each of you the outcome of the coin toss as we provide you your earnings in privacy.

[Enumerator: Please refer to the randomization lists provided to you to determine the color of the tag that will get payment for the spouse round and the color that will be paid for the stranger round. Also refer to the randomization list to find out whether each individual is paid as player 1 or player 2.]

Your final payment will therefore be determined by

- Your decision/Your partner's decision in task 1/2 (task that dictator was on that day).
- On top of these earnings, you will also receive the participation fee
- Also in addition, you will receive the money you earned in the first activity we performed, when we asked you to guess your partner's ranking of the food items flavors. Recall that we promised you we would give you Rs 50 if you guessed your partner's favorite food item or drink, and Rs 100 if you guessed both food item and drink preferred by your partner. If you guessed correctly, those earnings will be also included in your total payment.

[When distributing the payment envelopes]: Thank you very much for your participation! Please enjoy your lunch and don't hesitate to ask us questions if you have doubts before you leave.

D.3 Field experiment

The details of the randomized controlled trial are given in Afzal et al. (2021). The specific part of the endline questionnaire dealing with the gift experiment is reproduced below, together with the instructions for enumerators.

GIFT FOR PARTICIPATION

Thank you for answering our survey and being a part of our research.

Before we start with a small exercise, we would like to give you Rs. 300 as a compensation for your time in participating in this survey. These Rs. 300 are not a part of the activity and are yours to keep.

I would like to have brief conversation with your husband regarding our research. Can you please call him and give us 5 minutes alone in this room?

[ENUMERATOR: If husband is available and willing to talk to us, proceed with step 1 and step 2. If husband not available or unwilling to talk to us, ask if it is possible to call him and agree with him on a time to talk. If husband not available to talk on the phone, agree with the wife on a time to visit the household again when the husband will be present.]

[Enumerator: If the respondent is unmarried or her husband does not live with her/is not a part of the household roster, then ask for the oldest male household member. Step 1 is then to be administered to this male individual.]

If there is no husband and/or an adult male household member in the household then record 77:

_____ section_9

STEP 1: Husband

1. You may remember that 8-9 months back we asked you to make a choice between three household items (a male wallet, a female wallet and children's pencil case). Your choice was [report Item selected at baseline]

_____.

{ENUMERATOR: if he did not make a choice at baseline, we ask him to choose right now and note

a.Item selected: 1: male wallet, 2: female wallet, 3; child's pencil case.____ choice_1a

b.Recipient. i.e who is the item for? _____ choice_1b

c. What initials should appear on it?_____ choice_1c

2. Your wife was also asked to choose an item when we visited her 8-9 months back. As we explained last time, we will toss a coin to decide, between your choice and your wife's choice, which item your household will receive.

However, you can let your spouse choose in your stead, in which case, we will not toss a coin and simply select the gift according to your wife's choice.

Would you like to let your wife choose in your stead? _____[Yes/No] choice_2

If YES to 2[ENUMERATOR: Skip to 4]

3. If NO to 2: Would you be willing to let your wife choose in your stead if we offered you a voucher worth a certain amount of money? The value of this voucher is determined by a random draw and it can be either Rs.

X or Rs. XX. The value of the voucher is written in this sealed envelope [ENUMERATOR: Show the envelope to the respondent without opening the seal]. Before I open this envelope and reveal the value of the voucher, I will ask you whether you would be willing to let your wife choose the gift instead of you in exchange for the voucher, for each of the two possible values of the voucher. Once I open the envelope and reveal the value of the voucher, we will implement your choice corresponding to that value of the voucher. The voucher can be redeemed at the NRSP office three-four weeks from today, and we will send an SMS to inform you when the gift or voucher is ready to be collected.

Before we proceed, do you have any questions on this? [ENUMERATOR: Answer any questions before proceeding.]

- a. Would you let your wife choose the gift if the voucher were worth Rs. X? _____[Yes/No] choice_3a
- b. Would you let your wife choose the gift if the voucher were worth Rs. XX? _____[Yes/No] [ENUMERATOR: Ask this question regardless of the answer to 3a] choice_3b
- c. What is your best guess of your wife's choice among the three gift options? [_____ item] choice_3c
- d. Suppose you knew for sure that your wife's choice was the male wallet, how much money should the voucher be worth to induce you to let your wife choose the gift? [_____ Rupees] choice_3d
- e. Suppose you knew for sure that your wife's choice was the child's pencil case, how much should the voucher be worth to induce you to let your wife choose the gift? [_____ Rupees] choice_3e
- f. Suppose you knew for sure that your wife's choice was the female wallet, how much should the voucher be worth to induce you to let your wife choose the gift? [_____ Rupees] choice_3f
- g. Now we will find out the value of the voucher. [ENUMERATOR: Give the sealed envelope to the respondent to open.]
- h. Earlier you said that you would/would not [report respondent's answer to 3a or 3b, depending on the voucher value] let your wife choose the gift in exchange for a voucher of this value. So we will now implement your choice.
- i. [ENUMERATOR: If answer to 3a or 3b, is 'YES' to taking the voucher]

Take this voucher receipt of Rs _____. voucher_male

Please keep it safe. You will have to bring this voucher receipt with you to NRSP office to collect your money. We will now ask your wife to choose the gift.

[ENUMERATOR: If answer to 3a or 3b, is 'NO' to taking the voucher]

You will not receive the voucher, and your household's gift will be decided after we interview your wife.

[ENUMERATOR: Now go to step 2]

4. What is your best guess of your wife's choice among the three gift options? (1: male wallet, 2: female wallet, 3; child's pencil case.)_____ choice_4
5. Suppose that I was willing to give you a voucher worth a certain amount of money if you let your wife choose the gift instead of you.

a. Suppose also that you knew for sure that your wife's choice was the male wallet, how much money should the voucher be worth to induce you to let your wife choose the gift in your stead?

[_____ Rupees] choice_5a

b. Suppose you knew for sure that your wife's choice was the child's pencil case, how much should the voucher be worth to induce you to let your wife choose the gift in your stead?

[_____ Rupees] choice_5b

c. Suppose you knew for sure that your wife's choice was the female wallet, how much should the voucher be worth to induce you to let your wife choose the gift in your stead? [_____ Rupees] choice_5c

We also have a voucher in this envelope as a thank you for participating in our short questionnaire today. I will now/you may now open the envelope to see what the amount of this voucher is. This voucher can be redeemed at the NRSP office three-four weeks from today, and we will send an SMS to inform you when the gift and voucher are ready to be collected.

[Enumerator: Now go to step 2]

STEP 2: [ENUMERATOR: Go back to the female respondent.]

1. You may remember that 8-9 months back we asked you to make a choice between three household items (a male wallet, a female wallet and children's pencil case). Your choice was [report Item selected at baseline]_____.

{ENUMERATOR: if she did not make a choice about the initials to appear on the gift, ask now

a. What initials should appear on it? _____ choice_2_1}

2. Your husband was also asked to make a choice at that time and we have just asked him to confirm his choice.

3. As we explained last time, we will toss a coin to decide, between your choice and your husband's choice, which item your household will receive.

We will also give you a voucher for either Rs. 50 or Rs. 200. The value of the voucher is written in this sealed envelope [ENUMERATOR: Show the envelope to the respondent without opening the seal]. This voucher can be redeemed at the NRSP office three-four weeks from today, and we will send an SMS to inform you when the gift and voucher are ready to be collected.

Before I toss the coin to decide if you will get your choice or your husband's choice of gift, you can choose to forfeit the voucher and get your choice of the gift for sure –i.e. you can skip the coin toss and guarantee you get your choice for sure, in exchange for the voucher. Before I open this envelope and reveal the value of the voucher, I will ask you whether you would be willing to get your choice for sure in exchange for the voucher, for each of the two possible values of the voucher. Once I open the envelope and reveal the value of the voucher, we will implement your choice corresponding to that value of the voucher.

4. Would you forfeit the voucher to get your choice for sure if the voucher were worth Rs. Y? _____ [Yes/No] choice_2_4

5. Would you forfeit the voucher to get your choice for sure if the voucher were worth Rs. YY? _____ –[Yes/No] [ENUMERATOR: Ask this question regardless of the answer to 4] choice_2_5

6. What is your best guess of your husband's choice among the three gift options? (1: male wallet, 2: female wallet, 3; child's pencil case.) _____ choice_2_6

7. Suppose you knew for sure that your husband's choice was the male wallet, how much money would you be willing to give up to avoid the coin toss and make sure you got your choice for sure? [_____ Rupees] choice_2_7

8. Suppose you knew for sure that your husband's choice was the female wallet, how much money would you be willing to give up to avoid the coin toss and make sure you got your choice for sure? [_____ Rupees] choice_2_8

9. Suppose you knew for sure that your husband's choice was the child's pencil case, how much money would you be willing to give up to avoid the coin toss and make sure you got your choice for sure? [_____ Rupees] choice_2_9

10. Now we will find out the value of the voucher. [ENUMERATOR: Give the sealed envelope to the respondent to open]

11. Earlier you said that you would/would not [report respondent's answer to 4 or 5, depending on the voucher value] forfeit a voucher of this value in order to get your choice of gift for sure. So we will now implement your choice.

[If she has chosen to keep the voucher for the actual voucher value] For this value of the voucher you chose to toss the coin instead of forfeiting the voucher. Please toss the coin to determine whether you will get your choice or your husband's choice of gift. If the coin toss yields Head you will get your choice, if it yields Tails you will get your husband's choice. [Observe and record the outcome of the coin toss] The coin toss has come out _____ [Head/Tails]. coin_toss

[If she has chosen to forfeit the voucher and get her own choice for sure for the actual voucher value] For this value of the voucher you chose to forfeit the voucher instead of tossing the coin. You will thus receive your choice of gift.

[If her husband had delegated the choice to her in step 1] For your information, your husband chose [report item chosen by husband] _____ as a gift. He also chose to let you choose the gift instead of him. Therefore, you will receive the gift of your choice and you will not have to forfeit the voucher/ toss a coin.

12. For your information, your husband chose [report item chosen by husband] _____ as a gift. He also chose to not let you choose the gift instead of him.

13. To summarise, according to your choices today, you will receive [report item that the respondent will receive as gift (1: male wallet, 2: female wallet, 3; child's pencil case.)] _____ as a gift. final_gift

It will have [report initials that will have to be put on the gift that the respondent is to receive] _____ initials inscribed on it. final_initials

This receipt records the gift that you are entitled to receive [Hand receipt].

[If applicable] This also has the voucher of Rs _____. voucher_female

Please keep it safe. You will have to bring this receipt with you to NRSP office to collect your gift and/or money, once you receive an SMS telling you that they are ready to be collected, in about 3-4 weeks' time.

E Modal guessing

The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstrate that modal guessing is optimal in the context of our experiment. Consider a decision maker who receives a payoff y if he/she guesses the realized value of x where x takes M mutually exclusive values $\{x_1, \dots, x_M\}$ with corresponding probabilities $\{p_1, \dots, p_M\}$. These probabilities can be the actual probabilities or the decision maker's beliefs, but they represent the information available to the decision maker. We have indexed the different possible outcomes $\{x_1, \dots, x_M\}$ such that x_1 is the most likely realized value of x and thus p_1 is the mode of the distribution. The decision maker puts a value on y that is represented by utility function $u(y)$. This utility function is assumed to be monotonically increasing in y , but is otherwise unspecified. Without any loss of generality, we normalize $u(0) = 0$ and $u(y) = 1$.

The objective function of the decision maker is to select probability weights $\{w_i\}$ on different values of x so as to maximize the utility from the payoff. Given the parameters of the model, this is equivalent to selecting the probability weights $\{w_i\}$ that maximize the probability of making a correct guess. We claim that guessing x_1 , the modal value of x , maximizes the expected utility of the decision maker.

We first consider pure guesses, that is, guesses in which the decision maker chooses a single guess with certainty.

Proposition 1: Among all pure guesses, x_1 provides the highest expected payoff and is thus the optimal pure guess.

Proof: The expected payoff of guess $x_i = p_i u(y) + (1 - p_i) u(0) = p_i$. Since p_1 is the mode, guessing x_1 maximizes the expected payoff.

Let us now introduce mixed strategies, that is, strategies in which the decision maker randomizes his/her guess with probabilities $\{w_i\}$. We want to show that guessing x_1 dominates all mixed guessing strategies. The expected payoff from a randomized guess $\{w_i\}$ is $\sum_{i=1}^M w_i p_i$. Let us first consider the case where $M = 2$. Let w denote the probability that the decision maker guesses x_1 , the mode of the distribution, and $1 - w$ the probability of guessing x_2 . The expected payoff from this strategy is $E_w \equiv w p_1 + (1 - w) p_2$. It immediately follows that $\partial E_w / \partial w = p_1 - p_2 > 0$, implying that $w = 1$ is the optimal guess. This reasoning can be generalized as follows:

Proposition 2: Among all randomized guessing strategies, guessing x_1 provides the highest expected payoff and is thus the optimal pure guess.

Proof: We offer a simple a contrario proof. Suppose there is a better guess $\{w_i\}$ such that $E_w > p_1$. By definition we have:

$$E_w = \sum_{i=1}^M w_i p_i$$

Pick any $k \neq 1$ for which $w_k > 0$. Create an alternative guess $\{w'_i\}$ such that $w'_k = 0$ and $w'_1 = w_1 + w_k$: we have taken all the weight placed on guessing k and moved it to guessing 1. We have:

$$E_{w'} - E_w = E_w + w_k(p_1 - p_k) - E_w = w_k(p_1 - p_k) > 0$$

which leads to a contradiction. Hence $\{w_i\}$ could not have been optimal. The proof can be continued as follows. Pick another $k' \neq k, \neq 1$ such that $w_{k'} \neq 0$. By the same reasoning we can show that shifting $w_{k'}$ onto w_1 further improves our guess. Repeat the process until there is no $k'' \neq 1$ for which $w_{k''} > 0$, at which point no further improvement is possible. This point is reached when $w_1 = p_1$ and $w_i = 0$ for $i \neq 1$. QED

F Agency questions

Question	Description	Answer codes	Sample
household_12	Do you need to ask someone's permission for making the following decisions, and if yes from whom? (a) Purchasing ice cream for children, (b) Purchasing grocery, (c) Purchasing medicine for myself (d) Purchasing personal cosmetics/clothing (e) Taking a child to a doctor (f) Purchasing children's books / clothes, (g) Purchasing furniture (h) Purchasing refrigerator / TV (i) Sale of personal jewelry	1: Nobody, 2: Husband, 3: Mother-in-law/father-in-law, 4: Son, 5: Daughter, 6: Other male, 7: Other female	Field experiment (women only) and LAB1
p_1	Do you need to ask someone's permission for making the following decisions, and if yes from whom? (a) Purchasing ice cream for children, (b) Selecting food or drink for myself, (c) Purchasing grocery for the household, (d) Purchasing personal cosmetics/clothing, (e) Buying a snack or drink from a street vendor, (f) Taking a household member to the doctor, (g) Meeting a friend in town, (h) Purchasing clothes for our children, (i) Inviting a friend to visit our house, (j) Purchasing furniture for the household, (k) Selling my personal jewelry	0: No, 1: Yes	LAB2
consumption_8	Are your preferences/opinion taken into consideration when making the following types of decisions within your household? (a) Decisions regarding boys' schooling, (b) Decisions regarding girls' schooling, (c) Decisions regarding your children's marriage, (d) Decision regarding your medical care, (e) Decision regarding your children's medical care, (f) Decision regarding family planning, (g) Social visits to your family, (h) Decisions regarding purchase of clothing/cosmetics (j) Decision to work for earned income, (k) Decision to borrow money from an MFI, (l) Purchase of HH appliances (refrigerator, TV, etc), (m) Decision about house sale/purchase, (n) Decision regarding sale of personal jewelry	1: Always, 2: Most of the time, 3: Some of the time, 4: Rarely, 5: Never	Field experiment (women only)

G Photograph of personalized gifts for the field experiment

This photograph shows the three types of leather gifts offered to subjects in the field experiment. The orange wallet with a metal clasp is a money purse that Pakistani women keep in their bag. It is inscribed with the name, or initials, of the respondent, as per respondent preference. The small black wallet to the right is the type of wallet that men use. It is inscribed with the name of the respondent's husband. Both the name of the respondent and of her husband are taken from the household survey roster. The brown pouch on the left is the type of pencil case used by school-age children. The case is embossed with the initials of the child chosen by the respondent to receive this item. The initials on the pencil case are similarly restricted to be one of the respondent's children recorded in the household survey roster.

Figure G.1: Personalized gifts for respondents in field experiment



References

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